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Abstract
CONSTRAINTS IN PLAN IMPLEMENTATION:
THE CASE OF KENYA'S HOUSING POLICY
by
John Temediari Obomanu
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 23, 1983, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of City Planning
A great deal of attention has been paid to housing
policy in Kenya. Yet there remains a general feeling among the
KenyanS that the performance of the public housing sector has
been less than satisfactory. The public housing sector has
produced only a fraction of the housing called for during the
last two development plan periods and it appears as if the
housing objectives of the Fourth National Development Plan of
providing each Kenyan with a decent house to live in will not be
realized in the near future. Numerous theories and methods of
resolving the housing problem have been used, yet it is evident
that they have not been able to achieve their objectives. This
thesis is an attempt to understand the problems surrounding the
approaches that have been used in solving Kenya's housing
problems.
It is the contention in this study that the housing
problems realized in Kenya result from their inability to
implement their policies and strategies such as the "basic needs"
approach (BNA). Furthermore, it is the contention of this study
that the BNA is not implementable in a country such as Kenya,
that does not possess the necessary requirements for a successful
strategy.
Some of the recommendations provided in this study call
for (1) genuine commitment on the part of the administration; (2)
providing clearer definitions as to policy goals and how they are
to achieve such goals; (3) setting their goals accordingly with
the amount of resources available in the country; and (4)
restructuring the government, so that lower-income groups can be
better served.
Thesis Supervisor: Karen R. Polenske
Title: Professor of Urban Studies
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Despite many years of sustained efforts by the
international community, the problems of economic development
seem to be growing in size and complexity in Kenya. Many
solutions to Kenya's development problems have been proposed
over the last two decades. These development problems have
changed from being almost exclusively concerned with achieving
rapid rates of growth in gross national product (GNP) to being
more immediately concerned with the living conditions of the
poorest economic strata of societies. Over a period of several
years, various general development theories have been
introduced--namely (ILO, 1977, p. 1): "capital accumulation,"
"availability of foreign exchange," "industrialization,"
"import substitution," "export-oriented substitution," "rural
development," "population control," "human resource
development," employment strategies, and redistribution with
growth--just to name a few. Yet, despite these development
strategies, a large proportion of mankind still exists in the
most abject conditions of material deprivation.
According to the International Labor Office (ILO):
More than 700 million live in acute poverty and are
destitute. At least 460 million persons were estimated
to suffer from a severe degree of protein-energy
malnutrition even before the food crisis [in the 70's].
Scores of millions live constantly under a threat of
starvation. Countless millions suffer from
debilitating diseases of various sorts and lack access
to the most basic medical services. The squalor of
urban slums is too well known to need further
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emphasis. . . . The tragic waste of human resources in
the Third World is symbolized by nearly 300 million
persons unemployed or underemployed in the mid-1970's.
(ILO, 1977a, p. 1)
In Third World countries, there are a large number of
people who live in poverty, live without adequate housing and
basic medication, and live without adequate job opportunities.
These conditions remain despite impressive rates of growth in
many countries. Sharp inequalities in the distribution of
income and of wealth within and between countries have
highlighted the depths of impoverishment. For instance, in
Kenya, a report by the ILO noted that although Kenya was
developing at a growth rate of about seven percent, there were
still people in Kenya who were without, and the unemployment
rate was at fifteen percent and rising (ILO, 1972). The issue,
however, was not only that of unemployment. There existed also
groups of people who were working diligently and strenuously,
yet their employment was not productive in meeting their basic
needs. These needs included minimum housing, clothing,
education, utilities and nutritional standards. Meanwhile, new
solutions are continuously introduced to the ever-changing
ideas and strategies of development concepts, objectives and
theories. The "basic needs approach to development" has become
another development strategy proposed to ameliorate Kenya's
plight. According to the ILO:
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Basic needs are defined as the minimum standards of
living which a society should set for the poorest
groups of its people. The satisfaction of basic needs
means meeting the minimum requirements of a family for
personal consumption with regards to food, shelter, and
clothing, and it implies access to essential services,
such as sanitation, transportation, health and
education; it demands that every person available for
and willing to work should have an adequately
renumerated job. It further implies the satisfaction
of needs of a more qualitative nature. It aims at
providing a healthy, humane and satisfying environment.
It also assumes that even the most common people of a
country will participate in decision making that will
affect the lives and livelihood of the people and that
will assure freedoms.
(ILO, 1977a, p. 7)
Statement of the Problem
The problems that this thesis addresses are the
constraints prevalent in implementing the "basic needs"
approach with regard to Kenya's housing problem. The problem
this thesis addresses may be further clarified by posing a
number of questions.
1. Why is there a need for a "basic needs approach" (BNA) in
Kenya? What are the objectives of the BNA? What criticisms
can be posed about it?
2. How have housing development approaches historically dealt
with Kenya's housing problems? What implications have
previous development strategies had on more recent housing
policies?
3. How effective is the BNA in complementing the existing
governmental structure and institutions? How effective is
-10-
it in complementing the cultural belief system of the Kenyan
people?
4. How does a centralized government administration impact on
Kenya's housing problems? Are decentralization and the
existence of land resources prerequisites to the success of
the BNA? Are there other factors relevant in resolving
Kenya's housing problems?
5. How effectively have development plans been translated into
development programs by the Kenyan government?
The problem this thesis examines is important for a number
of reasons. First, this analysis aims to enhance the
understanding of why the "basic needs" approach, a new concept
that was recently adopted by the Kenyan government in their
Fourth National Development Plan 1979-1983, does not seem to be
resolving Kenya's housing problems. Second, since a great deal
of attention has historically been paid to housing problems in
Kenya, it hopes to further the understanding of why no
resolution has been found. Third, given the fact that many
housing development plans have failed in Kenya, this analysis
may provide insight as to whether previous development
strategies have been faulty in implementation or whether
economic uncertainties are responsible for the failures of
previous development plans. Finally, this thesis may provide
new insights into how housing plans may be more effectively
implemented in Kenya.
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Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this thesis is to imply that there are
institutional constraints found in the implementation of a
"basic needs" approach with regard to Kenya's houisng problems.
The specific objectives of the study are listed below:
1. To demonstrate that the "self help" strategy of the BNA has
not alleviated the problems of urban informal housing, the
squatter settlements in Kenya.
2. To demonstrate that decentralization and adequate
redistribution or allocation of land resources do not exist
in Kenya's institutional structure as they did in other
developing countries that successfully used the BNA.
3. To demonstrate that Kenya's housing problems primarily exist
as a result of the government's inability to translate
housing policies into implementable housing programs. For
the purposes of this thesis, the term "policy" refers to
goals stated in development plans, whereas the term
"program" refers to the implementable objectives of
policies.
4. To demonstrate that the governmental structures do not exist
to enact the proposed alternatives of loan provisions or
public housing provisions.
Rationale
The basis on which the case can be made that institutional
constraints prevalent in the "basic needs" approach make the
-12-
implementation of the "basic needs" approach infeasible lies in
the studies on development approaches.
In an analysis of the performance of the Fourth
Development Plan (1979-1983) of the Kenyan government, Shaw
(1983) cites that to date this implementation of the "basic
needs" approach to provide adequate housing has not
accommodated the rapid population growth of Kenya. Morawetz
(1977) suggests that three steps are essential in formulating a
need-oriented strategy: an approach applicable to Kenya's
housing problems. Morawetz suggests that these components
include explicitly defining the target groups, estimating their
consumption needs, and defining the implementation strategies.
There is no evidence to demonstrate that these steps have been
implemented in Kenya.
The "high growth and trickle down" strategy and the
"redistribution of income through growth" strategy were
development approaches adopted with implications for
alleviating Kenya's housing problems. However, these
development strategies failed because of their faulty
assumptions that economic growth would redistribute incomes
among Kenyan people without the need for specific gov-ermnt-al
sE-ate.-es g-rew-t-i m4---mem governmental intervention in
implementing the redistribution of income.
Most criticisms of development strategies are that they
lack the clarity necessary for implementation. Streeten
(1979), who is a proponent of the "basic needs" approach,
however, criticizes it as a concept because it has difficulties
-13-
being definitive about incorporating some objectives necessary
for successful development. Rather, it limits itself to basic
needs strategies often ignoring the political realities
encountered from institutional difficulties that result from
economic uncertainty, politician's interventions, and changing
needs.
Failure in the implementation of development strategies
also result from the adoption of successful development
strategies from governments with dissimilar circumstances. The
World Bank's (1980) study of the "basic needs" approach noted
that three common characteristics pre-existed in countries
which successfully implemented this plan. These countries all
had equitable distribution of assets, decentralized
decision-making, and women as participants in their political
system.
Based on these observations, it seems logical to conclude
that the implementation of the "basic needs" approach is
restricted by inadequately defined strategies, inappropriate
and unclear goals, and inadequate research into the suitability
of this strategy for the identified group.
Plan of the Thesis
In summary, this thesis will attempt to identify the
institutional constraints prevalent in Kenya's implementation
of a "basic needs" approach. Chapter 1 introduces the purpose
for the analysis of the institutional constraints prevalent in
Kenya's implementation of a "basic needs" approach. Chapter 1
also introduces the case that the "basic needs" approach is not
-14-
an effective strategy in resolving Kenya's housing problems.
Chapter 2 gives a general overview of the objectives of the
"basic needs" approach as a strategy for economic development
in Kenya. it also focuses on the implications of the "basic
needs" approach in resolving Kenya's housing problems. A
critique of the implementation of this strategy is also
presented in this chapter. Chapter 3 provides a framework for
analysis by providing an historical perspective of Kenya's
housing sector with an indication of Kenya's current
performance in meeting its housing needs. Chapter 4 focuses on
the identifiable constraints of formalization, centralization
and land resource for implementing an effective "basic needs"
approach. The case studies will deal specifically with Kenya's
land policy government's administration and the institutional
constraints prevalent in the development of urban informal
housing areas. By examination of these cases, especially the
issue of implementation, it will be possible to determine
whether Kenya actually needed a new strategy in order to
resolve her housing problems, or whether she needed a more
effective and/or efficient implementation program. Finally,
Chapter 5 summarizes, and explains the inferences that can be
drawn from this analysis. Some brief recommendations are also
suggested.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL BASIS ON WHICH THE BASIC NEEDS APPROACH IS FOUNDED
The provision of housing in Kenya is considered to be the
second most important priority by the Kenyan government (Kenya,
1979). Kenyan authorities admit to their inability to provide
houses and services for the masses of low income groups despite
huge expenditures to rectify the housing problem. The Fourth
Development Plan (1979-1983) of the Kenyan government estimates
that 290,000 housing units are needed per year in urban areas.
However, Kenya has failed to meet the necessary goal of
constructing 290,000 housing units per annum. Having only
1,623 units actually completed during the period of 1979-1980
(see Table 2.1) indicates that fewer than the projected 5,708
units deemed necessary during this period by the Fourth
Development Plan had been constructed (Kenya, 1979, p. 172).
As a result, an additional 140,000 new housing units would be
needed over a five year time frame to compensate for previous
housing under-production. The outlook for increasing housing
construction to meet the current demand seems bleak. The
existing number of service plots alone (794 existed by 1980)
would have to triple in order to achieve the planned physical
output of housing projected to be 11,532 by the end of the
implementation period of the Plan.
The projected increase in housing demands due to Kenya's
rapid population growth suggests that an additional 150,000
units will need to be constructed. These figures become more
-16-
Table 2.1
Projected Need and Cost
of Housing Units by Type in Kenya
(1980)
% in Money
% in
Physical
Units Cost K Value Value
Sites and Services 794 870,120 28 48.9
Tenant Purchase 808 2,095,100 66 49.8
Mortgage 15 153,187 5 0.9
Rental 6 26,500 1 0.4
TOTAL 1,623 3,144,907 100 100.0
Source: National Housing Council Report, 1980, Nairobi, Kenya.
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alarming when one takes into consideration that in 1982, which
in economic terms can be said to be the year when Kenya's
annual population exceeded the economic growth rate (Shaw,
1983, p. 23), Kenya's population will be increasing at an
approximate meteoric rate of 4.1% per annum. Thus, the
increase in population will only add to the existing housing
shortage.
In Kenya's rural areas, the total housing construction
requirement is estimated at 1,075,000 units over the course of
the five-year period of the Fourth National Development Plan
(1979-1983). The majority of the units needed in rural areas,
approximately 625,000 units, are needed to replace existing
housing units that are beyond repair.
Housing Development Approaches in Kenya since Independence
Kenya's strategies have not been very successful in
dealing with her housing problems. Since her Independence in
1963, two strategies have been adopted in an attempt to resolve
Kenya's housing problems. The "high growth and trickle down"
strategy and the "redistribution with growth" strategy have
both been housing development strategies aimed at raising the
housing standards for Kenya's masses of poor people.
Kenya's initial strategy was the "high growth and trickle
down" strategy of the 1950's and 1960's. This strategy was
based on the assumption that either the elimination of poverty
should be left to the government through the redistribution of
the elements of growth or that it should be achieved through an
increase in the Gross National Product. This plan, it was
-18-
believed, would raise the standard of living of the poor. In
the "high growth and trickle down" strategy there were no
active housing provisions for the Kenyan people. The
government believed problems of shelter would be eliminated in
the course of rapid growth (Kenya, 1973, p. 170). Satisfaction
with the achievements in eliminating poverty and shelter needs
during the "trickle down" period suggests that the government's
assumptions were incorrect. An implicit assumption was that
economic development would be achieved through
industrialization and that achieving aggregate or national
economic growth would, in time, benefit the individual citizen.
No explicit policies for redistribution were felt desirable or
necessary (see Williamson, 1965). However, the problem with
this policy during this period was its reported difficulty in
making any headway in solving development problems in the face
of multiple objectives (such as the reduction in income,
inequalities, economic growth, and the achievement of
self-sufficiency) and interlocking vicious circles (Morawetz,
1977, p. 8). The rich seemingly got richer, and inequities in
income become paramount (Kenya, 1973).
In summary, the "trickle down" strategy focused on
national income growth, by promoting industrial activities and
ensuring higher domestic savings and foreign investments, as a
means of improving Kenya's housing standards. This meant the
promotion of a new national industrial economy, with priorities
given to urban and industrial development.
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Kenya adopted a new strategy in its second development
plan period (1970-74) in another attempt to deal with the
problems of inequality still manifest in the economy. The
"redistribution with growth" strategy was a modification of the
"high growth and trickle down" strategy influenced by the
realization that Kenya's progress thus far had meant only "very
rapid development in no more than one or two relatively small
sections of the economy" (ILO, 1972). As a result, there were
serious "inequalities in income between a small number of
highly placed individuals on the one hand (in essence, large
farmers, people in business, politicians, the civil service and
certain professions) and the great mass of the people on the
other" (ILO, 1972).
The "redistribution of income through growth" strategy
utilized the tactics of deliberate intervention to redistribute
resources to the poorest sections of society, thus raising
their relative position. The objective was to reduce
inequities in incomes vis-a-vis the diffusion of development
benefits to the urban and rural poor. If a high growth rate
was accompanied by a falling share of income for the poorest
categories of people, then redistribution of income could be
achieved by reducing the economic growth rate while maintaining
the absolute level of income of the poor.
Two additional hypotheses can be rendered about the
failure of the "redistribution of income through growth" (ILO,
1977, Morawetz, 1977). The internal redistribution of assets
and incomes is a crucial strategy for reducing income
-20-
inequality. David Morawetz asserts that in a society (such as
that of Kenya) where economic growth has already commenced
amidst unequal income distribution, it is quite unlikely that
redistribution of income will occur (1977, p. 41). [This
argument may not be true in the case of Japan and the United
States.] Morawetz suggests that redistribution of income is
unlikely because the people who own capital assets are usually
unwilling to relinquish their advantageous position in order to
achieve equality in income.
In summary of the critical components of the
"redistribution with growth" strategy, this strategy primarily
attempted to redistribute development benefits to those needing
the most assistance--the urban and rural poor (Murison and Lea,
1979, p. 37). The emphasis of the strategy was on employment
generation, thereby eliminating rural poverty (Murison and
Lea, 1979, p. 37).
With regard to the failure of Kenya's first two
development strategies, the "high growth and trickle down" plan
and the "redistribution through growth" planrquestion remains
as to whether they failed because (1) the government did not
desire to implement redistribution of wealth among the Kenyan
people, or whether (2) the strategies ignored how economic
uncertainties would affect implementation plans. Streeten and
Stewart (1976) suggest that the "high growth and trickle down"
strategy did fail but it was not because the Kenyan government
did not have the will to implement these policies. Rather,
Streeten and Stewart (1976) hypothesize that they failed for
the following reasons (Streeten and Stewart, 1976, p. 388).
-21-
First, Streeten and Stewart (1976) indicate that it is
possible that the government lacks the knowledge and/or the
administrative power to redistribute income effectively.
"Public expenditure programs for rural areas are hard to
administer. Similarly, tax systems are notoriously
inefficient."
Streeten and Stewart's (1976) second argument suggests
that income inequities are an integral part of any development
strategy aimed at achieving economic growth through capitalism.
Third, they propose that when policy-makers benefit directly or
indirectly through the success of economic strategies. The
actions of government officials, they therefore hypothesize,
are autonomously imposed because of the possibility of
obtaining personal advantages from certain strategies.
Streeten and Stewart's (1976) arguments implying that the
government's naivete is a h benign force in the implementation
of development strategies may appear valid on the surface, but
when examined, there are some inconsistencies in this
assumption. For instance, the argument that the Kenyan
government lacks the knowledge, or the administrative power
necessary to accomplish the strategy such as the redistribution
of income is contradicted by the government's ability to
administer complex problems with regard to import restrictions
on i-veet investment licensing (see Ghai, et al., 1979).
Rather, the failure to implement a redistribution of wealth
strategy seems most related to the government's primary concern
for the elites in Kenyan society. These same elites control
-22-
government policies and are responsible for policy
implementation. Morawetz (1977) questions the feasibility of a
"redistribution through growth" strategy. His reason is that
economic growth is incongruent with the goals of income
redistribution, and the structure of growth often determines
the pattern of distribution until much higher levels of per
capita income are approached. What Morawetz recommends is that
if a "redistribution through growth" strategy were attempted,
it would become necessary to address, as an interim policy,
housing and utilities provisions, land reform, and mass
education, rather than leaving these items until later when
growth has occurred (Morawetz, 1977, p. 41).
Although it can be said at this point that the
policy-makers of Kenya may have reasons for failing to
recognize warnings of growth failures from historical evidence,
the government has the responsibility for failures in carrying
through policies and strategies successfully.
Streeten and Stewart's (1976) argument that income
inequity is inherent in some development strategies thus
suggests that the government has no responsibility in devising
development strategies and policies to decrease inequities in
income, housing, education, nutrition, and clothing. If no
strategies exist to redistribute income through growth, the
government should focus her public assistance efforts on
programs that will at least ease the hardship of the poor, or
leave the plight of the poor in Kenya to market forces.
Without programs to redistribute income through growth, Kenya
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will remain dependent on capitalist countries for technological
development because Kenya will not have the skilled labor of
her poor people to produce products nor will the Kenyan
government, burdened by its masses of poor people, have the
capital to invest in technological development. The
multi-national corporations, with skilled labor and financial
resources, will continue to provide products of luxurious
quality which only the rich can afford, will continue to flood
Kenya's job market, swelling the ranks of Kenya's poor and
unskilled, and will continue to make large profits often not
reinvested in the Kenyan economy.
As for the third argument, that policy-makers benefit from
success or failure, the author feels that it is highly unlikely
that policy-makers would want to relinquish their power unless
they found that they had no other choices. Such limitations in
choices would probably result from either a threat to their
positions or the possibility of rebellion by the masses (in
essence, a coup).
Kenya's Fourth National Development Plan: The "Basic Needs"
Approach
Kenya's most recent development strategy is the "basic
needs" Approach (BNA). Given the fact that past development
strategies introduced by the Kenyan government have failed to
work in solving Kenya's problems of economic development and
housing provisions, the question can be posed as to whether the
BNA is capable of achieving the primary objectives of
alleviating poverty and eliminating income inequities in Kenyan
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society. Furthermore, what is the rationale for the Kenyan
government selecting the BNA? The answers to these questions
lie in the plan and programs of the "basic need" approach and
its specific strategies with regards to Kenya's housing
problems. Considering the failures of the "high growth and
trickle down" strategy and the "redistribution through growth"
strategy, the question can be raised as to what ways the "basic
needs" approach remedies the failures of previous development
strategies.
The World Bank has been a major proponent of the "basic
needs" approach, suggesting that it will alleviate poverty and
eliminate income inequities. They have published a number of
reports promoting this relatively new idea of development for
developing countries to adopt as their strategy (see World
Bank, 1980a; Streeten, 1981). The World Bank rationale for
proposing the "basic needs" approach as a superior strategy is
that as an approach, it has the ability to (1) encourage
resources and materials, and (2) satisfy certain basic needs
and improve the quality of labor. The "basic needs" approach
is also attractive because it is congruent with the major
revisions that have occurred over the past ten years in World
Bank's lending patterns and policies (see Table 2.2).
Ten years ago, more than 58% of the World Bank's lending
activities were devoted to infrastructure projects. This
proportion dropped to about 37% by fiscal year 1980 (World
Bank, 1980, p. 34). An increasing proportion of its lending
activities is now committed to sectors directly contributing to
Table 2.2
IBRD/IDA Lending by Sectors
(in fiscal years)
Sectors of Lending
1970
In Millions of
1980 Dollars
1980
(Preliminary)
In millions of
% 1980 Dollars %
Average
Annual Growth
1970-1980
Infrastructure(l)
Sectors directly
linked to increas-
ing the productivity
of the poor
Production sectors
"New Style Projects" 2
"Basic Needs
Programs" 3
Other Production
Sectors4
TOTAL
3,784 58.3
506
166
340
7.8
2.6
5.2
2,197 33.9
6.487 100.0
0.8
20.8
28.6
14.4
I,
4,090
3,352
2,053
1,299
3,558
11.000
Source: World Bank, Poverty and Basic Needs, Washington, D.C., World Bank Publications, 1980, p. 34.
Note: There is some overlap between various categories. Also, all lending has varying degrees
of impact on poverty, directly or indirectly. This table is only illustrative to bring
out the major shift in sectoral emphasis over time.
1. Includes communications, energy, power, transportation and tourism.
2. Includes rural development and small scale industry projects where over 51% of the total benefit
is directed to poverty target groups.
3. Includes education, population, health, Sites and Services, and water supply.
4. Includes agriculture (excluding rural dev.), industry, technical assistance, and non-project
lending.
37.2
30.5
18.7
11.8
32.3
100.0
4.9
5.4
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the objective of poverty alleviation. In 1982, for instance,
the International Development Agency approved a $61 million
loan for Kenya's agricultural and housing sectors for the
implementation of strategies aimed at meeting the needs of
Kenya's poor. It is possible, therefore, that the Kenyan
government, pressured by a shift in the International
Development Agency's lending trends, may have adopted the
"basic needs" approach to improve its opportunities for loans.
There have certainly been cases to verify the assumption that
Kenya primarily adopted the "basic needs" approach because it
is a preferred policy by lending agencies. In Kenya's housing
sector for example, the World Bank (1975) was only amenable to
participating in the implementation of Kenya's housing
objectives when the Kenyan government adopted the
recommendation made by the World Bank for a Sites and Services
project.
The World Bank mission had recommended the Sites and
Services projects to encourage low-income groups to participate
in the construction of their own houses with the Kenyan
government's providing the building materials. The objective
of Dandora projects, a location on the eastern side of Nairobi,
Kenya, was to decrease the demand for housing by supplying new
homes. Planning was made for 6,000 plots to be given to
low-income Kenyans. In addition, the low-income Kenyans
targeted to develop the plots were given loans for the the
purchase of building materials. The construction of community
facilities such as schools, health centers, markets, and
-27-
innovative approaches were to be provided by the government.
The government would also provide the city planning strategies
necessary for the installation of utilities. These plans would
have lost effectiveness as primary goals in the implementation
of city planning (Beardmore, 1978). Effective housing
strategies led to the official endorsement of the sites and
services concept in the 1974-1978 and 1979-1983 National
Development Plans for Kenya and the agreement of the World Bank
to finance the Dandora Sites and Services Housing Project
(Kenya, 1973, p. 70; Kenya, 1979, p. 172).
The persuasiveness of the World Bank and the adoption of
the "basic needs" approach in Kenya depicts the vulnerability
of the Kenyan government to external forces (in essence, the
dependency of the government on other countries to provide
development aid).
Some critics may argue that Kenya did not have to accept
aid that included housing strategy stipulations. They suggest
that the Sites and Services project recommended by the World
Bank was not appropriate for Kenya (HRDU, 1979). Nevertheless,
when we consider that the World Bank has been involved in the
Kenyan housing sector since 1971, and that most of the funds,
technology, and capital, devoted to housing developments in
Kenya, come from donor agencies and/or other governments, it is
not surprising that a donor agency, like the World Bank, would
have the control and influence to determine what strategies
Kenya would adopt to resolve her housing problems. The BNA is
even more attractive because its name has political appeal.
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Its name can enable the Kenyan government to suggest to her
people that the government is attempting to at least attend to
"basic needs." With the illusions provoked by the name "basic
need" the government might avoid major responsibilities, such
as the construction of homes for the poor. The BNA, after all,
is another form of redistribution through growth which might
counter the personal aims of government officials. The
government could maintain the existing direction of the housing
policy simply by describinq it with a more palatable name.
The "basic needs" approach is a strategy designed to
accomplish the following goals (World Bank, 1980a, pp. 9-12):
First, what is made clear by the "basic needs" approach as
cited in publications of World Bank studies, is that the
provisions of basic needs--better education, nutrition, and
health are beneficial in reducing fertility, raising labor
productivity, enhancing people's adaptability and capacity for
change, and creating a political environment for stable
development.
Second, the pressing basic needs of low-income people can
be met successfully without sacrificing economic growth.
Third, the BNA provides housing solutions which can be
implemented within a framework by improved management of
resources.
The World Bank also recommends the re-allocation of
existing resources to facilitate and achieve the objectives of
meeting basic needs. The World Bank is also a proponent of the
acquisition of external assistance from developed countries to
embark on such redevelopment.
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The fundamental feature of a basic needs strategy is its
central emphasis on meeting the basic needs of the poor masses
within the shortest possible period.
Streeten, another development economist and proponent of
the basic needs approach, further elaborated on the objectives
of basic needs. According to him, the basic needs approach to
development has three objectives (Streeten, 1979, p. 4):
(1) The provision of real incomes that are adequate to
buy necessities such as food, clothing, household goods,
transportation, fuel, and shelter. This implies productive and
remunerative livelihoods (employment and self-employment) that
give people a primary claim to what they produce, and
recognition of their contribution.
(2) Access to public services such as education, health
care, water, and sanitation. This implies a physical and
social infrastructure adequate to provide basic goods and
services on a sustained basis and to allow for the growth
fulfillment of basic needs.
(3) Participation in the formulation and implementation of
projects, programs, and policies by the people affected, and
local mobilization of under-utilized resources. These
objectives are controversial. Countries that adopted basic
needs as a strategy seemed to have three common characteristics
(World Bank, 1980a, pp. 10-12):
(1) They all had fairly equitable distribution of physical
assets, particularly land;
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(2) They all had decentralized decision-making, providing
support and giving the local level more autonomy; and
(3) In countries that had relatively partial success with
"basic-needs" strategy (for example, Sri Lanka), all more
fully recognized the role of women in the political
systems.
The above findings seem to imply that these countries with
equitable distribution of land, decentralized decision-making
and the recognition of women in political systems, were able to
achieve a measure of success by adopting the "basic-needs"
approach. Thus, if basic needs were successfully adopted in
such countries, the question then arises as to whether the
"basic-needs" approach can successfully be applied to other
countries deficient of such characteristics, or as can be
restated, can the "basic-needs" approach strategy be adopted in
countries such as Kenya, where equitable distribution of land
and decentralization of decision-making could be said to be
less evident? These -kinds of problems are rarely addressed in
the literature.
Housing Strategies Adapted from the "Basic Needs" Approach
The Kenyan government, in their Fourth National
Redevelopment Plan, adapted several general objectives from the
"basic needs" approach to alleviate Kenya's housing problems.
The objectives aimed at (Kenya, 1979, pp. 172-173):
1. Increasing the stock of housing in the urban areas to meet
the growing demand by urban residents.
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2. Attending to the existent housing shortage.
3. Ensuring the deliverance of housing produced to targeted
groups.
4. Maintaining a healthy and safe urban environment, free from
the dangers of fire and epidemics.
5. Improving the conditions of rural housing.
With regards to specifically addressing Kenya's urban
housing problems, the Kenyan government intended to:
1. Allocate most of its resources to the provision of housing
for its low-income families. Site and Services housing
supposedly functions as a realistic and useful tool for use
in satisfying the housing needs for the majority of
low-income groups. In order to minimize travel costs from
places of employment, Site and Service schemes were to be
located near industrial areas.
2. Improve standards of dwelling units in slum areas. However,
additional squatter settlements were to be discouraged.
3. Introduce rent control to prevent abuses by landlords, while
ensuring a profitable return for the landlord on the capital
invested in housing.
4. Subject to the availability of funds, provide
tenant-purchase housing for those that could afford it.
Rural housing objectives derived from the "basic needs"
approach differ from some urban housing objectives.
Development of rural housing is to be undertaken by the rural
people themselves (Kenya, 1979, p. 173). The role of the
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government in rural housing is to be one of encouraging the
improvement of rural housing conditions through the "self help"
approach.
Case For, and Criticisms of, the BNA
Proponents (Ghai, 1979, Streeten, 1979) for the "basic
needs" approach summarize the rationale for a "basic needs"
approach as follows:
1. The basic needs approach saves resources, mobilizes
resources, and increases the productivity obtained from
resource use. The "basic needs" approach therefore can
achieve a given objective sooner than can a housing
development plan solely based on an income-oriented
approach.
2. The resource gap in the provision of basic needs would be
closed or narrowed in terms of meeting the needs of Kenya is
low-income groups and achieving the government's objectives.
3. The "basic needs" approach is valid in its own right because
it raises productivity and lowers reproductiSty.
Critics of the "basic needs" approach find fault with the
definition of basic needs itself. The "basic needs" approach
to housing development seemingly is a culmination of selective
features from twenty-five years of previous housing development
plans. Even proponents, such as Streeten (1979), for the
strategy refer to the initial definition of the "basic needs"
approach as being
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intellectually clumsy because of the difficulties of
demarcation and of incorporating objectives other than
basic needs; it therefore suffers from political
unreality. More generally, this definition tends to
blur the features that distinguish the "basic needs"
approach from other strategies and makes it more
difficult to define areas of disagreement and thereby
reach agreement.
(Streeten, 1979b, p. 43)
Streeten also had comments about a revised definition. Here,
he finds that the approach emphasizes the "paradigmatic
change."
This approach has the tactical defects of its
intellectual merits: it tends to evoke controversy,
arouse opposition to certain aspects and may reduce the
changes of reaching agreement on action.
(Streeten, 1979b, p. 43)
Streeten does, however, acknowledge that the approach has both
intellectual and political appeal, "because it cannot be
accused of simply pouring old wine into new bottles or of
concealing behind a polemical slogan questions calling for
serious analysis and experiment" (Streeten, 1979b, p. 43).
The World Bank's experiences in using the "basic needs"
approach have indicated the possibility of providing adequate
and acceptable shelter within certain income constraints for
all except possibly those in the lowest 5 to 10 percent of the
income distribution (World Bank, 1980, pp. 4-5). This figure
may seem small, but if one considers household income
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distribution in Nairobi, for example, the "lowest 5 to 10
percent" of the income distribution consists of almost the
entire low-income population group (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4).
In effect, studies conducted by the World Bank suggesting the
BNA as a good approach to Kenya's housing problems would not be
of much help to Kenya. The low-income groups would still be
without homes. In fact, it seems as if World Bank strategies
for low-income housing never seem able to accommodate the needs
of the lowest 20 percent of income groups.
Continuing with the criticisms of the "basic needs"
approach, we find that the concept of basic needs is fast
becoming an endangered code word (Stewart, 1979, p. 1). To
some, the concept of providing for the basic needs of the poor
represents a futile attempt to redistribute income and provide
welfare services to the poor without stimulating corresponding
increases in their productivity to pay for them. To others,
the "basic needs" approach conjures up the image of a move
towards socialism, with reference being made to China and Cuba
(World Bank, 1980a, p. 32). Yet, others view it as a
capitalist conspiracy to deny industrialization and
modernization to the developing countries, thereby keeping them
dependent on the developed world (Frank, 1980, p. 289).
The question remains to be whether the poor obtain what
they want or what some external authority believes they need.
This remains the central conflict because there exists a
distributional dilemma, similar to the one inherent in using
statistics on average Gross National Product as a measure of
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Table 2.3
Shares of GNP
Accruing to Income Groups in Kenya
Share of Total Income (%)
1969 1976
Poorest 25% of 4.1 6.2
Population
Richest 10% of 56.3 37.7
Population
Source: Killick, Tony (ed.), Papers on the Kenyan Economy:
Performance, Problems and Policies, Nairobi, Heinemann
Educational Books, Ltd., p. 9.
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Table 2.4
Nairobi Household Income Distribution, 1974
Household
Income Group
(KSh/mo.)
0-99
100-199
200-299
300-399
400-499
500-699
700-999
1,000-1,499
1,500-1,999
2,000-2,499
above 2,499
Mean per capita
Income
(KSh/mo.)
15.3
71.6
91.2
100.6
147.7
143.9
179.2
288.0
291.0
386.0
1,003.5
Percent
Population
1.0
1.0
6.5
8.0
6.0
14.1
18.1
17.6
8.4
3.0
16.4
Source: "Household Budget Survey," Central Bureau of Statistics. This
table is reproduced from Poverty and Growth in Kenya, Annex I of
Growth and Structural Change in Kenya, IBRD, 1981.
Percent
Income
0.05
0.21
1.80
2.45
2.73
6.19
9.88
15.49
7.44
3.54
50.22
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welfare. The use of statistics as an indicator of average GNP
creates the impression that Kenyans are financially better off
when the majority of Kenyans are not. The statistics are used
to support the existing economic development plans because the
government has deemed the statistical proof more important then
the human condition. The ranking of a country's development
plan priorities always occur. "A 10 percent increase in
literacy and complete freedom from malaria or a 60 percent
increase in literacy and no improvement in health" (Morawetz,
1977, p. 44).
Housing provisions in Kenya's development plans have
always been prioritized. The next chapter provides some
explanations as to why housing provisions have been important
in the development strategies of Kenya as well as to her Third
World countries. It presents an historical account of Kenya's
housing policies, and it examines and critiques the
performance of Kenya's housing sector.
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CHAPTER THREE
HISTORY AND IMPLICATIONS
OF KENYA'S HOUSING POLICIES
Housing provisions are considered to be important to the
development of a developing country (i.e., Kenya) for economic,
social, and political reasons (World Bank, 1975, pp. 4 and 5).
1. Economic
" Next to food, housing usually constitutes the second largest
item of housing expenditure (15% to 20%).
* Investment in housing represents up to 20% to 30% of fixed
capital formation in countries with vigorous housing
programs (Grimes, 1976, p. 30).
e Housing enables countries that have under-utilized labor,
materials, and financial resources to be more productive at
lower costs.
2. Social
* Housing shelters people from the elements.
* Housing provides access to jobs, sanitation facilities,
security, and education (Stern, 1978, p. 2).
* Housing in proximity to employment is a way of saving people
time, and money.
* Housing is the principal transaction by which communities
are created.
3. Political
* Housing can be used as a tool for mobilizing political
support.
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It was not until 1966 that the Kenyan government
officially became involved in housing (HRDU, 1979, p. 19).
This involvement by the government was stipulated in a
Sessional Paper (Government of Kenya, 1966/67), following a
United Nations (UN) sponsored Bloomberg/Abrams Report on
Kenya's housing needs (Bloomberg and Abrams, 1964). According
to the Housing Research and Development Unit (1979) report:
The terms of reference of the UN Mission were to
conduct a study of short- and long-term housing needs
and to make recommendations to the Government on
housing policies within the framework of social and
economic development planning. (p. 19)
Consequently, the Sessional Paper discussed inter-alia, "the
issue of aided self-help schemes, which were identified as the
panacea for the housing problems facing the disadvantaged urban
workers. The paper endorsed a recommendation to the effect
that a National Housing Authority be established to coordinate
housing programs, particularly those relating to the local
authorities" (HRDU, 1979, p. 19). As a result of the UN study
recommendation, the National Housing Corporation was founded in
1967, to succeed the now defunct Central Housing Board. The
Corporation's responsibilities were to deal with the practical,
technical, and administrative dimensions of housing,
particularly those pertaining to project implementation (HRDU,
1979, p. 19).
The Government's initial allocation of funds for housing
in the 1970-74 National Development Plan (NDP) came as no
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surprise because indications already existed that this would
occur in the Sessional paper. The only problem at the time,
however, was that the development strategy and objective was
aimed at the achievement of rapid growth through
industrialization (Kenya, 1969). Thus, Kenya was somewhat
reluctant in investing much of their capital and resources into
housing production. For example, the National Development Plan
went as far as fixing a maximum cost limit of Kb1,200 per unit
for housing financed from NDP funds. Housing that cost over
KL1,200 would have to be taken care of by the Housing Finance
Company of Kenya, together with the private sector (HRDU, 1979,
p. 21). At that time, economists and government officials
envisioned the provision of public housing as an investment in
a non-productive sector, and they argued that the same
resources could have been used to purchase more machinery or to
build more factories (Wu, 1979, pp. 38-39). The Kenyan
government later realized that their policies raised conflict
between demands of public housing and the promotion of
effective national growth (in essence, the housing problem
still persisted) (Stern, 1978, pp. 220-221). For example,
after a new City Council housing list was established, it grew
rapidly--reaching 27,756 by March 1975. As the Economic Survey
commented:
In Nairobi 60 percent of the people on [this] waiting
list earned less than K.Sh.833 a month compared with a
rental of K.Sh.650 a month for a three-bedroom flat in
Nairobi's most recently completed housing scheme. The
sharp rise in building costs is making it now
progressively more difficult for people on low incomes
to be provided with adequate housing.
(Kenya, 1975, p. 145)
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Also of some controversy at this time was the "self-help"
approach utilized by the government for solving the housing
problem (Kenya, 1969).
The rationale behind the "self-help" approach taken by the
government of Kenya was that it allowed the people to build
what they wanted. The idea was that the individual is in a
better position to provide more suitable living conditions for
himself, and the individual can build a house at a cheaper rate
than can the government. The assumption of self-help would
imply that, because underemployment exists in the economy, the
individual will have the time to construct his own house. It
is also assumed that the self-help approach will be able to
economize resources and materials, satisfy certain basic needs,
and improve the quality of labor (Ghai, 1979, p. 33).
Proponents of the "self-help" construction strategy
seemingly failed to take into consideration, however, that the
individual may be unskilled in housing construction. Hence, a
longer time-period might be required to build a house, which
means incurring more costs. Not unrelated to this fact, is
that an individual could adjust his time to be spent either in
the labor market or with his family, since Kenyan people
sometimes have two or three jobs (Kitching, 1980, p. 1). The
person in the rural areas can be a farmer in the morning and a
trader in the afternoon. The value of time (in essence, the
opportunity cost) for this person would therefore be considered
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high (Ghai, 1979, p. 33). The main criticism of "self-help"
projects, therefore, is that the government cannot just assume
that the costs will be cheaper if an individual constructs his
own home. In fact, the government may also be taking away the
jobs of private contractors when employing the "self-help"
concept. Contracts that are supposed to be allocated for small
contractors have been known to end up in the hands of brothers
or tribesmen of the elite, who probably prefer to build housing
for upper-income groups so as to gain more profit (Leys, 1974).
The purpose of providing homes for low-income families is
therefore self-defeating.
The housing policy for the 1974-78 Development Plan was
somewhat changed by incorporating a desire to streamline
housing design and construction in an accordance with
Government determined standards. That is to say, each housing
unit constructed in an urban setting would be expected to have
a minimum of two habitable rooms, plus a kitchen and toilet
(HRDU, 1979, p. 21). In addition, the plan advocated
government action against further spread of squatter
settlements, slum clearance through the process of
resettlement, and improving of sub-standard urban housing (in
essence, the Strategy for Housing Policy [for example, Sites
and Services] was aimed at areas of high unemployment) (Kenya,
1973). Similarly, by addressing itself to such issues as unit
cost, services, zoning, and affordability, the plan constituted
a very significant chapter i4 the history of housing policy and
programming in Kenya (HRDU, 1979, p. 21). For example, for the
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1974-78 plan period, there was an increase of 230% in the
allocation of funds for housing. "The total amount allocated
was Kh34.5 million as compared to Kbl4.9 million in the
previous five-year period" (HRDU, 1979, p. 26).
The 1979-83 Development Plan did not offer any new
policies or programs for housing. According to the Housing
Research and Development Unit (1979) report:
it merely underlines the policies and programmes of the
previous plan, notably those aspects regarding squatter
upgrading, promotion of the sites and services
strategy, and the advancement of the housing interests
of the disadvantaged urban worker. (p. 21)
Allocation for housing in the 1979-83 Development Plan was
increased by 66% (in essence, KB57.2 million) (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 is a breakdown of funds allocated to housing form
1964 to 1983 by the government of Kenya. As we can observe
from the table, the housing fund allocation has increased
virtually every year.
Considering all the attention and money spent by the
Government to solve Kenya's housing problem, it would be
expected that the performance of the housing sector would be
impressive. Instead, the opposite has been the case, as will
be demonstrated in the analysis presented in the next section.
Indicators of Housing Performance
In 1979, when the fourth development plan was introduced,
we were told that the current short-fall of units located in
Table 3.1
Annual Allocation of Development Funds
for Housing
Public and Private Sectors (Planned) 1964-1983
Funds Funds Funds Funds
Allocated to Allocated to Allocated to Allocated to
Housing Housing Housing Housing
Year (1964-68) Year (1969-73) Year (1974-78) Year (1979-83)
1964 N/A 1969 N/A 1974 25.14 1979 38.22
1965 N/A 1970 13.32 1975 28.36 1980 47.27
1966 N/A 1971 18.32 1976 32.71 1981 48.44
1967 N/A 1972 20.31 1977 36.07 1982 48.82
1968 N/A 1973 23.29 1978 42.06 1983 51.36
TOTAL N/A 75.25 164.34 234.11
Sources: National Development Plans
(1964-70; 1970-74; 1974-78; 1979-83)
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urban areas came to 140,000 units (Kenya, 1979, p. 172). To
meet the present demand for houV§ng, 30,000 units needed to be
constructed annually. This, of course, does not take into
account the rapid urban growth rate of approximately 7% that is
now occurring (Farugee, 1978, p. 110).
Due to the inadequacy of reliable data, it is difficult to
provide an accurate assessment or evaluation of the current
performaonTe of proposed targets for the housing sector.
Nevertheless, data that are usually used are obtained from a
1979 Central Bureau fo Statistics (CBS) Rent Survey of urban
areas. This Survey probably provides the most accurate
coverage of the housing stock that is currently available (see
Table 3.2).
The table is a breakdown of the existing housing stock in
urban areas by ownership pattern. A brief examination shows
that over 80% of the urban stock is owned by the private
sector, 23% of which are squatter settlements (i.e., informal
housing). The picture of the public sector is worse when we
consider that the public sector consists of staff housing and
private rental units constructed prior to 1976.
One of the goals of the housing policy for Kenya of having
each individual own at least a two-room dwelling unit is yet to
be realized (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 also provides information on the types of
structures and tenancy statutes of the private housing stock.
An examination of the table shows that by the end of 1979, only
4% of the housing stock was owner-occupied. The majority of
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Table 3.2
Percentage Distribution of Urban Dwelling Units
by Sector, 1979 (percent) (a)
Private Sector
Formal (b) 64
Informal (c) 18
Sub-Total 82
Public Sector
Local Authorities 10
Central Government (d) 8
Sub-Total 18
Notes:
(a) A dwelling unit is defined as a place of residence for a family,
an individual, or a group of persons eating together and sharing
the budget for common provisions. A single housing structure
may contain multiple dwelling units.
(b) Includes site and service plots provided by the public sector.
(c) Informal housing includes both squatter settlements and housing
developed ty land-owners who have not completed the required
legal procedures of sub-division and registration. Much of the
latter type of housing is owned by land companies, such as those
holding large tracts of Marthare Valley in Nairobi.
(d) Includes public boards and corporations.
Source: "Report on the 1979 Rent Survey in Urban Areas of Kenya,
CBS, 1981.
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Table 3.3
Local Authority Housing Stock, 1969,80
1969 1976 1980
Type Number % Number %1 Number /0
Rental Housing 27,092 90 30,674 80 34,820 69
Tenant Pruchase 1,852 6 4,185 11 6,243 12
Site-and-Service Plots 1,321 4 3,593 9 9,861 19
TOTAL 30,265 100 38,452 100 50,924 100
Source: Up to 1974, "Local Authority Housing in Kenya,"
HRDU, 1978. Thereafter, NHC Annual Reports
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tenants (84%) lived in dwelling units that were not
self-contained. Over three-quarters of the urban households
were renters. In the Dandora Site and Service Housing Scheme
for instance, two-thirds of the residents were tenants and only
one-fifth of the plots were occupied by a single household
(Soni, 1980, Introduction). Even though the renting of urban
housing in now encouraged, housing standards and lower costs
have caused additional problems. Lowering the costs of Sites
and Services Housing Schemes so that they can be affordable by
the lowest third of the income distribution has meant adopting
standards generally unacceptable to the local authorities.
Even with the acceptance of subletting, the government often
fails to realize or determine the socio-economic factors
responsible for subletting. Compared to other projects in
other countries (Tanzania, for instance), subletting has been
exceptionally high, particularly the Dandora project (Serga,
Neleti and Associates, 1980, Report No. 8). Monitoring studies
of the Dandora project have compared tenant and allottee
populations and found several interesting results. Some of
them are listed below (Serga, Neleti and Associates, 1980):
(1) Despite similarities that exist between tenant
population and residents of urban informal housing
developments, the tenant population shows higher incomes from
employment than do the the original allottees.
(2) Overcrowding is still present among the tenant
population and those allocated spaces. Three-quarters of the
residents who sublet apartments have no intention of giving
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them up, at any time soon (Serga, Neleti and Associates, 1980,
Report No. 8).
What the above data indicate is that the present
government policy of providing single-family occupancy is
probably unrealistic. Questions would have to be raised as to
why the government would want to do this, considering the
present population increase and very tight housing situation
for low-income families (see Table 3.4).
The 1979 rent survey has also indicated an increase in the
number of dwelling units in urban areas, at the rate of 8.1%
per annum, with an average increase of 9.9% for the private
sector and 1.4% for the public sector (CBS Rent Survey, 1979).
Although this figure is compatible with data on the value of
residential building plans approved by different municipalities
(see Table 3.5), the value of building plans is considered to
be a more reliable indication of activity than the number of
approvals. For example, a single building plan can cover a
number of houses for a community but approved building plans
may never be constructed. Furthermore, the value of public
residential building plans was no more than a fraction of the
value of private building plans and showed little growth over
the period 1976-80 (CBS Rent Survey, 1979). Perhaps this
justifies the conclusion that "performance of the public sector
and not necessarily the private sector has been deficient" (CBS
Rent Survey, 1979).
On the other hand, the housing problem in rural areas is
not so much that of shortages in actual physical structures, as
Table 3.4
Urban Growth Projections to Year 2000 (in 000's)
1979
(Actual)
Popu- % Share of
lation Urban Pop.
(Based
Growth
Popu-
lation
2000
on 1969-79
Rates) (a)
% Share of
-Urban Pop.
(Based
Growth
Popu-
lation
2000
on 1962-69
Rates) (b)
% Share of
Urban Pop.
Nairobi 828 36 2,300 27 3,500 41
Mombasa 341 15 700 8 1,100 13
Other Existing Centers 1,138 49 5,100 59 3,500 41
New Urban Centers -- -- 500 6 500 6
TOTAL 2,307 100 8,600 100 8,600 100
Percentage of Population
Living in Urban Areas 15 28 28
Notes:
(a) Assumed growth rates: Nairobi, 5.0%; Mombasa, 3.3%; other existing centers, 7.4%.
(b) As given in "Human Settlements in Kenya," pp. 88-95. The estimages shown are
an average of the high and low projections for the major cities and generally
assume some diminuation of the 1962-69 growth rates.
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, Washington, D.C., World Bank Publications,
1979.
U,
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Table 3.5
Value of Residential Building Plans
Approved by Municipalities 1976-80 (KEOOO)
Private
Nairobi City
Council Mun
6,927
15,177
26.202
33,641
53,238
Public
Other
icipalities
4,440
4,072
8,266
12,808
10,827
Nairobi City
Council
598
2,965
4,716
1,765
1,322
Other
Municipalities
1,364
125
540
693
1,637
Source: Economic Survey, 1981, CBS.
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
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that of the poor condition of these structures and the general
lack of service facilities in the rural settlements. The
process of rapid urbanization has depleted the rural community
of its young and economically able. Similarly, migration to
urban areas would be considered an additional problem on
institutional arrangements because these migrants would have
been placed under pressure on urban facilities, causing an
imbalance of investment resources in urban areas.
Consequently, the result over the years may have also resulted
in a stagnation of rural development.
Apart from the possible stagnation in rural settlements,
water supplies close to where people live have been lacking.
Presently it is estimated that only fifteen percent of all
rural population are now on pipe-borne water supply, and it
will not be until the year 2000 that all rural areas will be
satisfactorily supplied (National Environmental Secretariat,
1978, p. 6).
Availability of land in rural area is obviously a
prerequisite to development, yet the problems associated with
the availability of desirable land has also been a limited
resource in Kenya. Land has been a scarce commodity in that
its supply is limited by the territorial boundaries with
population growth. In the past, the government made land
available for various development projects from unalienated
government and trust land inherited at the time of
Independence. This land has now been exhausted. The
government's reason for lack of involvement in rural housing is
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due to the fact that rural incomes are not high enough to
demand housing of high standards (Farugee, 1978, p. 3).
Another indicator of the housing market is the behavior of
rents. Table 3.6 presents rental indices for Nairobi,
stratified by three income groups. The data provided indicate
that increases in rental prices for upper-income residents have
corresponded with increases in other prices over the period
1975 to 1979, while rentals for the middle- and lower-income
groups have "shot ahead" of other price changes. The
low-income groups, in particular, have been the target for rent
increases. Low-income renters often end up paying more than
what the house may have cost when originally constructed.
These price changes show that although the housing sector
may have been able to maintain an adequate provision for the
upper-income group, the middle- and lower-income groups have
been deprived from having "adequate" housing. The implications
reflect the relative dominance of the private sector in serving
the upper-income group, and to some extent the middle-income
group. On the other hand, the lower-income group does not have
much choice but to depend on the public sector for its housing
provision.
What all of the above data and indicators have suggested,
is that the public sector in particular needs improvement in
terms of Policy Implementation, so as to meet the need for
urban housing resulting from rapid growth. Whether policies
will be revised and new policies adopted is also a matter of
"will" on the part of those concerned.
Table 3.6
Rent Index for Nairobi, 1975-79
by Income Group (a)
5-Year
Change in Price Index
Year (b) Rent for All Other
Income Group 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Index Commodities
Upper Income 96.9 109.3 115.6 135.1 145.7 164.2 67.3 71.5
Annual Change 12.4 6.3 19.5 10.6 18.5
Middle Income 96.2 111.1 120.5 146.3 158.7 175.3 79.1 61.9
Annual Change 14.9 9.4 25.8 12.4 16.6
Lower Income 95.3 140.0 124.3 161.0 187.7 205.1 109.8 78.8
Annual Change 18.7 10.3 39.7 23.7 17.4
Residential n.a. n.a. 181.0 198.9 215.5 n.a.
Cost Index (c) 17.9 16.6
(a) Base: January-June 1975 = 100
(b) Computed at December of each year.
(c) Base: December 1972 = 100
n.a. = not available
Source: "Statistical Abstract," Central Bureau of Statistics.
5-Year
Change in
Ul
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Conclusion
From the policy point of view, the housing problem in
Kenya can be characterized as a gap between need and demand.
Estimates of housing needs, such as those cited in the fourth
development plan, are derived from surveys of the homeless,
overcrowding, below-standard housing, and projected population
change and depreciation. Estimates of demand, on the other
hand, essentially involve a comparison of incomes and prices.
Theoretically, bridging the gap between need and demand
would just require either the increasing of incomes or the
reducing of prices (ILO, 1976). However, it is not that simple
in practice. For example, it is possible that having realized
the magnitude of the housing problem in Kenya, anyone could
argue that instead of the Kenyan government adopting a
"self-help" approach to housing, what would seem more logical
to solving the housing problem would be to raise the incomes of
poverty groups. Supporters of this view argue that this could
be in the form of:
(i) changing the relative prices of materials and labor
services that the poor provide, compared with prices of things
that they purchase;
(ii) introducing consumption transfers that benefit the
poor;
(iii) introducing investment transfers to the poor; and
(iv) redistributing part of the existing stock of capital
to the poor, by such measures as land reform (ILO, 1977).
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This may be so, but would this really be the solution? It
is certainly not as simple as it sounds. First, these methods
of redistribution would have to be combined with progressive
taxation and redistribution of assets in order to be effective
(ILO, 1977, p. 34). Relative price changes are not capable of
altering the share of income that the poor would receive. Any
changes would be marginal, and these price changes could lead
to secondary effects that phase out the initial impact. For
example, higher incomes may increase the cost and price
consumed by the poor. Hence, the poor will be "back to square
one"--distribution of income remained virtually unchanged.
Furthermore, no one can be certain that the increase of incomes
would be realized by the poor only. Public housing projects
designed for the poor, for example, have been known to benefit
income groups other than the poor (World Bank, "Shelter," p.
8).
Other related criticisms of the "income approach" have
stemmed from the fact that, while the income approach may
provide adequate personal income to pay the rent, some basic
needs remain, such as health, education, safe water, and
sewage, that cannot be bought by the private individual. These
needs can be provided for only through public effort (Streeten,
1979, p. 7). This notwithstanding, the income approach is also
said to ignore those individuals who are incapable of earning
an income--the unemployables--and that it ignores non-material
needs (Streeten, 1979, p. 7).
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Given the weaknesses of both the income and self-help
approaches, one would wonder whether these suggested solutions
to the housing problem have any actual relevance.
Nevertheless, no matter what approach is adopted, the crucial
issue still remains, that of how to transform such an approach
or policy into a successful outcome. This is one aspect that
is neglected by both proponents and opponents alike. Policy
implementation is a crucial process that determines the kind of
success (outcome) that should be expected of any policy. To
further highlight e this point, the analysis in the next
chapter will consider specific cases where institutional
constraints have impeded the performance of housing policy.
-58-
CHAPTER FOUR
CONSTRAINTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF "BASIC NEEDS" APPROACH
IN KENYA'S HOUSING POLICY
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the constraints
pevent which preVent the implementation of the "basic needs"
approach to Kenya's housing problems. The author will
demonstrate in this chapter that the housing problems
experienced in Kenya today are primarily the result of three
institutional factors (the first two of which are
interrelated).
A. the lack of clear objectives (Formulation)
B. the inability to translate policies into programs
(Centralization)
C. the problem of land acquisition and redistribution
(Resources).
A. Formulation
The problem of formulation will be examined in the context
of BNA's inability to clarify objections in its housing
policies as exemplified in urban informal housing developments.
In order to achieve this goal, the history of the origins of
the urban informal sector is presented. A statement of the
institutional factors relevant to urban informal housing are
addressed. Subsequently, institutional factors that act as
constraints in urban informal housing are analyzed. In
concluding, the alternative approaches aimed at resolving the
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problems of urban informal housing are assessed. The author
also suggests that the inability to effectively implement
housing programs is the cause for deficiencies in housing
policies.
General Background
A study was done by the International Labor Organization,
in 1972, on Kenya's unemployment income and inequality problem
(ILO, "Employment, Incomes and Equality," 1972). The study
recommended several things, one of which was for the government
of Kenya to recognize the informal sector. The study had
identified the informal sector as being (ILO, 1972):
(i) A sector to which entry by new enterprises is
comparatively easy
(ii) Enterprises in this sector rely on indigenous resources
and are family-owned.
(iii) Enterprises operate on a small scale
(iv) Enterprises operate in unregulated and competitive
markets
(v) Enterprises use labor-intensive and adapted technologies
(vi) Enterprise workers have skills acquired outside the
formal school system.
The ILO's assessment of Kenya's unemployment, income, and
inequality problems, however, is faulted because in the
identification of the informal sector there is no clarity as
to what is meant by "small scale" (in essence, is it 10 or
500?). Most of the definitions given could very well apply to
the formal sector as well.
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Bearing the difficulty and lack of clarity in identifying
what is the ideal definition of the informal sector, by the ILO
(1972) an attempt has been made to define urban informal
housing to include all those urban areas that do not comply
with one or more of the existing legal regulations on planning
or development of residential areas (in essence, squatter
settlements).
In Kenya, most of the population living in urban areas
have had to live in houses that have not been "up to standard"
in the eyes of the authorities (Dwyer, 1975). Only recently
(1974) have changes occurred in official attitudes towards
urban settlements and other inadequate housing. In the past,
officials had tried unsuccessfully to force the people from
squatter settlements and to diminish their numbers. As a
result, the Kenyan people simply moved their settlements
elsewhere (these settlements were cheap to construct), and the
problem persisted.
With the increase in informal housing areas and the drift
of people from rural to urban areas, the Kenyan government
needed to evaluate their policies. Different studies were
undertaken by various planners. Interestingly enough, the
informal housing areas proved to possess some positive features
(see Etherton, Ma-rheae, Veley, 1971).
In terms of social aspects, the social scientists point
out that there often exists a closely knit system that develops
in the informal sector. The people in these areas are able to
develop social relations with each other since they share the
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common problems of inadequate accommodation. In this regard,
the people in the informal sector are able to unite to fight
against the system. Assuming this is true, the closely knit
system present in these informal areas can enable leaders of
these areas to mobilize political support to serve their
interests in times of election.
From an economic point of view, informal housing areas
provide a large percentage of the labor force (or "reserve army
of labor"), and one of their main economic functions is
providing cheap rental accommodation for these people. With
the incomes most of the informal housing residents receive,
they cannot afford to live elsewhere. Some of the residents in
these areas have even turned to subletting their homes for
extra income (Etherton, 1971, p. 90).
Surprisingly, the physical development of many informal
housing areas, especially the more traditional ones, are not
always entirely deplorable.
With the result of the study showing positive features of
the informal housing areas, the question remains as to why
there is much concern about the development of these housing
areas.
From the point of view of the inhabitants, the answer to
the question about why so much concern exists regarding the
development of informal housing areas is ne-t that they are not
recognized by the officials as legalized structures. The
failure of these areas to comply with all legal ordinances has
meant that the usual urban services, such as pipe-borne water,
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roads, electricity and social amenities, are often not provided
by the government. This has resulted in the inhabitants having
found other ways of providing all these urban services for
themselves. The lack of legal security has also resulted in
the inhabitants having little incentive in improving their
homes or living environment (Hoek-Smit, 1976, p. 3).
The authorities have argued that it is necessary to bring
the informal housing sector within the framework of legal
institutions. Their rationale for doing so is that they
anticipated that this will allow an adequate control of
development to be exercised over a scarce item like urban land.
It will also make it possible for the government to acquire
revenue from land, businesses, and homes (Dwyer, 1975).
Moreover, informal housing areas have the stereotype of being
breeding grounds for criminals and are places considered to be
hazardous to one's health because of the overcrowding and the
lack of services. More importantly, these housing areas are
viewed by officials as "eyesores" that need to be demolished.
What generally happens in practice, however, is that these
areas may be used for political purposes, whereby the
government embarks on demolition of these areas to demonstrate
to the elites or other pressure groups that something is being
done about these "hazardous" areas (Mbithi and Barnes, 1975).
The overriding issue therefore is in trying to incorporate
these areas into the legal framework. Factors, such as the
physical quality of structures, level and improbability of
services, socio-economic and political characteristics of the
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population, have served to form the basis of a number of
classifications in the informal housing areas (see Turner,
1968). These classifications have led to questions being
raised by the authorities concerned, as to whether or not to
upgrade, redevelop, or demolish and settle the population
concerned. The indecisiveness about what to do with informal
housing has been reflected in Kenya's development plans.
Development Plan and Urban Informal Housing
Maintaining adequate standards of living and housing has
been the primary emphasis of Kenya's development plans
concerning informal housing areas (Kenya, 1979, p. 172).
Various building and planning by-laws have been undertaken and
the formalization of such areas has meant that they will have
to comply with these legal regulations. Needless to say, the
factors that have stimulated the "positive features" observed
in informal housing areas (described earlier) ought to be
incorporated in any development strategy the Kenyan government
embarks upon. The government cannot ignore the sector, because
the failure of intervention could be the foundation of
reactionary groups and result in social upheaval (which any
government wants to avoid). Economists have suggested that
development be directed towards the income level and the
priorities of the inhabitants of these informal housing areas
(Hoek-Smit, 1980). This would mean that the low-rent character
and income opportunities--such as income from subletting--would
be maintained. It has also been suggested in studies of
informal housing areas that the inhabitants need opportunities
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to participate in the improvement of their own living
environment (Hoek-Smit, 1970, p. 49). The assumption involved
in the inhabitants' participation is that by doing so, the
authorities will be better able to contribute to the
maintenance of the existing community.
Though obtaining development input from the inhabitants of
informal housing areas is easier said than done, it should be
realized that if all development input in informal areas comes
from the outside sources, then the result possibly would be a
disruption in the implementations. It may also result in the
re-evaluation of the housing policy development plans. This
action may be initiated by informal housing area inhabitants or
their sympathizers. In addition, it might be expended without
meeting the essential needs of these residents. Public funds
are limited to public low-cost housing, and measures will be
needed to stimulate and assist private investment by the
inhabitants, in terms of both labor and capital. Hoek-Smit
(1980), who did a study on informal housing, described what
such measures would entail.
(i) the provision of security and tenure to the house-owners,
both as an incentive for the individual owners to invest
in their homes and as security for obtaining a loan;
(ii) the development of a loan system that is accessible and
suitable to the needs of the often diverse group of
house-owners; and
(iii) the promotion and the realization of the self-help
potential through a community development program.
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Furthermore, it is imperative to acknowledge to what
extent the existing organizations and legal regulations in
Kenya form either a barrier or a strong basis for development
of informal housing areas along the lines of these objectives.
Some of the existing regulations would come from institutional
regulatory policies regarding minimum housing standards,
building codes, and a public health act.
Standards
Controversy exists between many economists and planners as
to what is considered "adequate" housing standards for the
inhabitants. There is little argument, however, that the units
have to be cheap and affordable as a prerequisite of adequate
housing. Many of the inhabitants are poor, and studies on
housing preferences of inhabitants of these areas show that the
price is critical; less importance is placed on the quality of
such units (Peattie and Doeble, 1976). Also of importance is
the amount of space surrounding the house and the availability
of services such as water, roads, and street lighting (Dwyer,
1975). Hoek-Smit noted that the building regulations imposed
by the government do not allow for people to build affordable
homes they desire to, and as a a result there is a lack of
development in these areas (Hoek-Smit, 1976, p. 5).
The Building Code
In Kenya, the building code is comprised of two separate
local government orders, namely Grade I and Grade II By-laws
(Hoek-Smit, 1976). Grade I By-Laws cover private high-quality
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structures, whereas Grade II By-Laws cover low-quality
structures (Hoek-Smit, 1976, p. 5). Since we are mostly
concerned with low-quality structures (informal housing), the
Grade II By-laws will be considered here. However, a problem
exists in that there are situations where some informal housing
areas are granted Grade I status (because of location). This
presents a problem in that an upgrading to a Grade II status is
needed before the set of Grade II By-laws can be applicable.
These By-Laws can be summarized into materials, space, and
structural standards (Hoek-Smit, 1976, pp. 7, 8).
Grade II by-laws have stipulations regarding sanitation
and building construction. In terms of sanitation, Grade II
by-laws allow for non-water, home sanitation provided that
minimum standards are maintained and soil conditions are
suitable. In low-cost housing, the position of water-home
sanitary facilities often accounts for one-third to one-half of
the total cost of a house (depending on its size). Sanitation
can thus be considered a crucial factor. With regards to
materials, Grade II by-laws allow for the use of "temporary" or
"substitute" material for walls. Mud and wattle, mud-bricks,
cement blocks, and corrugated iron for the roof are
frequently-used substitutes.
Space and structural standards provide a problem when
considering construction quality and materials. Foundations
are often non-existing which means homes are not very sturdy.
Any sort of improvement on the existing structures would
therefore have to begin from the foundation level. On the
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other hand, there is some flexibility in Grade II by-laws with
regards to space requirements. Rooms may not always have the
required sizes and heights (Dwyer, 1975).
Flexibility is also provided in the planning standards in
the sense that the Councils can waive certain rules, though
often only with the approval of the commissioner of lands,
and/or the medical officer of the health department or the
chief health inspector (Kasner, 1977).
According to Hoek-Smit, Grade II by-laws "allow far too
much flexibility" (Hock-Smit, 1977, p. 7). Much of the burden
of enforcement is left to local authorities, who often do not
possess adequate staffing to investigate other alternatives
available, other than those they previously have used
successfully. Consequently, by-laws are often applied
stringently or higher standards are imposed on new structures
(Hoek-Smit, 1977, p. 8).
Public Health Act
If interpretation and application posed a problem in the
case of building codes, it is an- even more serious in the case
of the Public Health Act, which provides general health
requirements and leaves it to national and local authorities to
translate these into measurable building requirements (section
126 of the Public Health Act). The Public Health Act's lack of
definitive policies leaves it susceptible to the whims or
discretion of medical officers who have the power to turn down
final approvals of any building or housing scheme on grounds of
what they feel to be undesirable developments (Hoek-Smit, 1977,
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pp. 8, 9). Poorly defined guidelines in the Public Health Act
also result in decision-makers making conservative choices in
policy implementation until further research is done in the
public health field. Without research providing information on
the ill-effects and problems of the Public Health Act, it is
doubtful if the attitudes of the officials are going to change.
Conclusion
From our observation of urban informal housing, there
exists no legal framework that specifically address improvement
schemes in planning standards, although some degree of
flexibility is tolerated by the officials. In any case, it
seems highly desirable that a consistent and workable set of
planning standards be used as a set of guidelines for the
improvement of informal residential areas.
Informal housing areas differ considerably in their layout
and density. They range from areas with a highly irregular
layout and high densities to areas with a planned layout and an
acceptable density of rooms per housing area. As a result of
these irregularities in informal housing areas, policy
regulations are impeded.
Plot size, space requirements, and road reserves pose
outstanding problems for designing an improvement plan. Plot
sizes vary a great deal, and it is often quite expensive to
upgrade existing structures. Problems also arise from having
to provide roads and public services to residential plots
according to Grade II by-laws (Town Planning Handbook, 1971).
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These problems are not easily resolved, partly because the
standards are not always applicable due to inconsistencies of
urban informal housing and the inconsistency of the planning
regulations. Furthermore, local authorities are often
reluctant to take responsibility for and maintain roads that
are not of high quality (Hoek-Smit, 1976). This has meant that
the cost of an improvement plan would be astronomical unless
the inhabitants possessed sufficient resources to maintain the
roads in their area. The Kenyan Bureau of Statistics is
considering the revision of standards, in order to better meet
local requirements and local industry capabilities (Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1981, p. 178). But, as a Kenyan architect
points out,
In his wish to become modernized and noting the
contempt with which his traditions were regarded by the
colonial powers, Kenya's African architect or
administrator has accepted unreservedly whatever has
come from the west and has, up to now, joined his
western colleagues in disregarding the local
traditional building materials and methods.
(Mann, 1968)
Finally, the question of self-reliance in the development
of informal housing areas is a question of how to assist and
stimulate the self-reliance of the population living in
informal housing areas. From our observation of the Urban
Informal Housing Development plan, there exists the need to
identify which policy is best suited in helping to meet the
needs of the poor in informal areas. Jorgensen suggests that a
policy that includes loan provision is best for rectifying the
problems of Urban Informal Housing (Jorgensen, 1975, NHC,
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1976). In contrast, Kazner proposes that government
intervention through the construction of public housing for the
poor as a resolution to the housing problem (Kazner, 1977).
Obviously, there are limitations in Jorgansen's and
Kazner's recommendations. For instance, in terms of the
proposed lending strategies there are several limitations:
1. The construction of affordable houses often makes use of
temporary materials. Construction using this type of
material cannot generally be financed by a loan as depicted
in housing regulations.
2. Many of the home-owners are elderly (Lewis and Ottenbin,
1975). They may not be able to benefit from a loan
program, being that they are not healthy enough to
construct their own homes. Subcontracting will enrich only
a few and any repayment obligation will only be a burden on
the elderly because they receive no income.
3. There is also the belief that the money designated for
housing is often used for purposes other than home
construction (Peattie and Doeble, 1976). It is often said
that potential home-owners use the money obtained for
housing to pay obligations like sending children to school
or for non-essential items like entertaining guests or
parties.
4. At times, loans are not taken advantage of because people
may fear that they may not be able to repay them within the
term of the loan. As mentioned above, housing for many is
not taken as a first priority (Peattie and Doeble, 1976).
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Therefore, the loan system may be utilized to meet other
existing needs rather than for housing.
This raises the questions of how housing eligibility is
determined, and how the people will be provided with the raw
materials necessary for housing construction. There are bound
to be large differences in the amount of money needed.
Moreover, materials and labor costs vary considerably
throughout the country. The required standards in different
regions, at times varies from those on which calculations are
based in policy formulation. The limits that may be imposed on
a loan may, in practice, become a considerable restriction,
given the complex situation existing in many informal areas.
Regarding Kazner's (1977) proposal of producing housing
for the poor, the problems experienced in such a policy are:
1. Housing may never be allocated to those for whom it was
originally intended. Most of the housing might become
occupied or rented by the middle-class.
2. The government sometimes does not want to get involved in
providing housing for the poor because people with low
incomes often do not have the capital to afford even
minimal standard housing.
3. Housing is not considered a "capital good" and is therefore
not a good investment. Some economists maintain that it is
a waste of money to provide housing for its people (Renaud,
1980). Instead, money should be allocated to machines that
will generate a multiplication of goods, which many can
partake of. One house will be good for only the one
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family's needs, but a machine can accommodate the needs of
many people.
Given the "deficiencies" in the finance and provision
systems for housing, the question can be raised as to what
alternative plan may be implemented.
Previous experiences suggest that the failure of housing
improvement projects are typically not the result of failures
in housing provisions or of a strong financial system. Rather,
the fault lies in policy implementation, specifically in the
lack of coordination between authorities and inhabitants. Any
improvement scheme designed for the informal housing areas
needs to take into consideration the structure and
socio-economic characteristics of the inhabitants [in essence,
income and employment structure, social relations] (United
Nations, 1971). Such schemes should also be able to:
(i) Provide government support to stimulate self-help and
improve communications and cooperation with the leaders
and inhabitants of informal housing areas.
(ii) Acknowledge the existence of these people and strengthen
their sense of community.
It is the inhabitants who will determine if a program succeeds
or not, not the government's or economist's policies.
B. Centralization
To better understand the constraints found in Kenya's
Administration, it is important first to give an overview of
planning and administration in Kenya.
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An Overview of Planning and Administration in Kenya
Kenya's administrative plans developed from early attempts
by the colonial administration to structure and coordinate
development and budgetary activities in its overseas
possessions (Hyden et al., 1970, p. 176). At first the
colonial powers introduced the United Kingdom's Colonial Paper
No. 3 on development planning, which instructed colonies to
prepare a ten-year development plan (Nicoleson, 1958, pp.
62-63). However, this was little more than the elaboration of
departmental plans and associated budgets for recurrent and
capital expenditures. Effective planning did not start until
1945, when the British established a Development and
Reconstruction Authority and the formation of a Planning
Committee under its jurisdiction in 1948. By the time of
Independence in 1963, an associated committee system had
evolved. In 1964, a Directorate of Planning was established in
Kenya's Ministry of Finance. Since that time, however,
attempts have been made to build an effective planning
organization that might link the central government with
individual and groups in the countryside by means of
specialized roles and structures, using a host of committees on
provincial and district levels (Hyden, 1970, p. 177). However,
"this structure has only been partially successful in shaping
the development activities in Kenya and in the rural areas; its
impact has clearly been marginal" (Hyden, 1970, p. 177). In
fact, Frank Holmquist suggested that probably less than 5% of
rural development activities during that time were initiated,
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shaped, or controlled by the formal planning structure (see
Holmquist, 1970).
Kenya no doubt has inherited some of the basic features of
the British system of government, but they seemingly have been
transmitted somewhat arbitrarily "from an earlier concern with
gaining control and protecting the white settler minority, to a
terminal concern with welfare and expanded social, economic,
and political opportunity for Africans (Hyden, 1970, p. 6).
This British "authoritarian method" reflected similar
policies in other British colonies prior to the 1960's.
However, Kenya's case was rather unique, for the colonialists
decided to settle in Kenya, even after Kenya had gained
Independence in 1963. Before leaving, the British had not
succeeded in installing a parliamentary system because their
efforts had been impeded by the 'Mau Mau' revolution, which was
primarily a nationalistic response by some Kenyans to the
alienation of their land by settlers. Therefore, the British
influence on African political consciousness was not as strong
as it might have been, yet the authoritarian character of the
British administration impacted on the African political
leaders who took over the running of the country. Nothing
seemed to change in terms of administration. The authoritarian
character of the British government during the colonial era
seemed evident in the social esteem and high status granted to
officers of the post-Independence Administration and is
probably still reflected in Kenya today.
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After British occupation, Kenya was faced with the problem
of trying to segregate the legacy of the colonial era from
current African political thought. The nature of such
political thought was reflected in the government's White Paper
on African Socialism, which extols the virtue of the positive
and creative state in the service of popular development goals
(Hyden, 1970, p. 6). The impression the government had at the
time was that the government would be able to solve all the
fundamental problems of national unity and development, once in
office. Those in power seemingly took advantage of the
ideological support given to them by the Kenyan peoples and
automatically assumed a form of "statism," despite traditional
cultural norms in Kenya that have always emphasized values of
equality and voluntarism in social and political action (Hyden,
1970, p. 6).
Politicians also took advantage of the fact that Kenya
lacked a hierarchical authority system. Rather than having
activities carried out on a large voluntary and communal basis,
they were able to take control of the principal activities
pertaining to the welfare of local communities (Hyden et al.,
1970).
Characteristics of the Civil Service
At the time of Independence, Kenya had inherited a much
more elaborate administrative organization than most other
British colonies in Africa. The size of the civil service was
about one-third larger than that of Tanzania, although the
latter had a larger population (Bienen, 1974, p. 30). This
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discrepancy can be explained with reference to at least three
factors--the provision of services to a white-settler
population, the Mau Mau uprising, and the fact that Tanzania
was under United Nations trusteeship and of less immediate
interest to Britain (Bienen, 1
The growth in size of the
was in part a response to
economy of Kenya was perceived
was, in fact, growing). For
Gross National Product (GNP)
1964-66 period (Bienen, 1974,
civil service may also be a re
cope effectively with, and
Meanwhile, however, expansion
the way for personal needs
974, p. 30).
Civil Service after Independence
economic needs (in essence, the
to have potential for growth and
instance, the total cumulative
expansion was at 6.8 % during the
pp. 32-33). The growth of the
flection of government efforts to
guide, the development process.
and economic change also paved
. Bienen commented that, "As the
Kenyan Government implemented policies designed to Africanize
trade and business, personnel were required to administer
licensing and loan programs" (Bienen, 1974, p. 33). He was
probably right in this observation, that the growth of Kenya's
civil service was only partially a response of an
administration to economic growth and growth potential, and to
the concern for structural transformation of the economy. The
growth of the civil service ". . . must also be viewed as the
consequences of the autonomous goal-setting character of the
civil service itself" (Hyden, 1974, p. 9). Because of the
growth of the civil service, a great deal of speculation
occurred, but it was accompanied by problems. For example:
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The proliferation of ministries and departments is not
solely a technical matter but may often reflect
political considerations. For example, in many
political systems, ministries and departments,
important positions are awarded to key supporters or
members of the ruling party and become their won
'possessions' to be staffed, in turn, by their own
followers. In rural political systems with
heterogeneous and fragile basics of support there is
likely to be a strong need for a relatively large
number of ministries so that all supporting groups can
be properly rewarded.
(Hyden, 1974, p. 9)
The proliferation of governmental agencies in Kenya today
is reflective of the administration's need to reward supporting
groups (Hyden, 1974, p. 10). Because of the many favors that
need to be obliged, the creation of a large number of
ministries are required. However, in order to achieve a form
of efficiency, consideration of administrative efficiency may
very well demand that the ministries be consolidated or
reduced. One example in Kenya can be drawn from the field of
rural development, where several ministries were expected to
cooperate in assisting farmers to increase agricultural
productivity (Hyden, 1974, p. 12). As it turned out, such
cooperation could not be achieved, because the ministries had
separate field organizations responsive to different
hierarchical authorities.
After viewing the type of administration that Kenya has,
it is no wonder then that Kenya has failed to implement most of
its housing policy and development plans. Concentration of
political activity is at the federal level, and this means that
the federal government is remotely involved in the actual
administrative operations to exercise much control of the
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detailed decisions that constitute program administration.
They can, of course, set out on a course of becoming involved
in administrative details at the local level, but here again we
find a second limitation on centralization. The Public Housing
Sector agencies are often already overloaded with demands,
crises, and various pressures and problems requiring quick
responses, so that they do not have time for simple
administrative details. The Site and Service Housing Schemes
(SSHS), which are managed at the federal level, are a good
example of an agency's inability to quickly and effectively
respond to administrative details. The federal government has
opted for the SSHS as the most pragmatic approach to low-cost
housing problems (HRDU, 1979, p. 24), and because SSHS is
concentrated in or around major urban areas--particularly
Nairobi and Mombasa (see Table 4.1), most of the development
programs for these areas, such as public services, schools, and
so on, are bound to result in an increase of people from the
rural areas into these urban areas. Apart from the regional
biases that may occur, an extra burden is being placed on the
NHC and other local government authorities, because they will
have to accommodate the housing needs of these "new
immigrants." Consequently, the amount of money budgeted for
housing in the five-year Development Plan will not be enough to
provide for the increased demand for housing created by the
influx of rural inhabitants. Another way to look at it would
mean that even if administrative effectiveness were to exist in
Kenya, the initial project appropriations would only be able to
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Table 4.1
Geographical Distribution of Houses
(Sites and Services)
Completed during 1980
No. Units
Cost
% i n In
, o. ,nits
MUNICIPALITIES
Nairobi
Mombasa
Nakuru
Kakamega
Kericho
Eldoret
Machakos
TOTAL MUNICIPALITIES
600
208
120
273
6
15
176
1.398
36.91
12.81
7.39
16.82
0.36
0.92
10.84
86.10
1,373,000
722,100
143,420
250,000
26,500
153,187
206,300
2,874,507
TOWNS AND URBAN COUNCILS
Malindi 142 8.74 155,400 4.94
CITY COUNCILS
01 Kalou 83 5.11 115,000 3.65
TOTAL KENYA 1,623 100 3,144,907 100
Source: National Housing Corporation, Annual
Nairobi, Government Printer, 1980, p. 15.
Report, 1980.
Plac %-
43.65
22.96
4.56
7.94
0.84
4.87
6.55
91.37
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construct a portion of the units originally planned for because
of the increased demands. A "no-win" situation would exist
whereby housing policy implementation would seemingly never be
able to match the demand. Another interpretation might suggest
that "because the ability of the development administration
agencies to fully utilize annual development appropriations, is
often seen as an imperative for successful plan implementation"
(Chege, 1972, p. 6), housing policy implementation would
inevitably become a failure. For example,
The government has over the plan periods injected
sizeable amounts of funds into the housing sector.
Although it is argued in certain quarters that funds
allocated to sites and services have been inadequate,
it is not very convincing to attribute the ineffective
implementation of the schemes to widespread inflation
and inadequate loan facilities, in view of the fact
that substantial portions of the housing revenue has
had to be returned to the Treasury because of inability
to utilize the money.
(HRDU, 1979, p. 27)
Government reports and publications, as well as
information on the historical background on relationships
between central and local agencies in Kenya, have shown that
Kenya has been unable to accomplish the objectives of its
housing policies, because of long delays (see Table 4.2).
These delays were found in foreign aid negotiations or in the
detailed preparation of projects due to the redesigning of
earlier plans because of new knowledge or donor insistence
(HRDU, 1979, pp. 72-75). The implication of various delays
has been that potential benefits are not captured. The
slowness in implementing projects at the local level also
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Table 4.2
Construction of Infrastructure Services
for Completed Schemes
Final Date Construction Final
Construction Period Delay
Months Months in
Planned Actual Planned Actual Months
Dandora
Phase I 10/76 12/76 12 12 2
Nakura
Langa III 12/77 12/78 12. 7 12
Thika 10 10/77 10/78 18 16 12
Nanyuki III 5/77 5/78 13 13 12
Webuye 6/77 6/77 N/A 15 0
Kiambu 10/76 3/79 4 23 29
Source: National Housing Corporation, Annual Report, 1980,
Nairobi, Government Printer, 1980, p. 15.
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results in the difficulty of fulfilling the schedule of the
nation's Development Plan. Furthermore, due to the lack of
co-ordination between federal and local agencies, policies are
easily misunderstood, misinterpreted, or changed to suit
political needs. For example,
the NHC has mentioned several instances where, contrary
to the official policy, Government officials, some in
senior positions have interfered with the work of the
corporation, by for example, allowing the construction
of a two-story high-cost housing on a serviced plot in
the Bungoma site and services project.
(HRDU, 1979, p. 26)
This is another illustration that casts doubt on whether any
program or policy, however well understood, will be acceptable
or implementable, so long as there are political interferences
and pressures prominent in the implementation process.
Conclusion
The political influence exercised during the course of
execution is perhaps as detrimental to effective planning as
any other facet of political activity. Quite frequently,
politics affects the selection of a development site, the
choice of contractors and suppliers, and the selection of
employees (see Stolper, 1966). In addition, because there are
no known administrative checks and balances present in Kenya,
some agencies charged with project execution may be liable to
the misuse of funds, as was the case with the NHC. Policy
implementation, in this regard, can be conceptualized as an
"ongoing process of decision-making by a variety of actors, the
ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content of the
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program being pursued and by the interaction of the decision
makers within a given politico-administrative context"
(Grindle, 1976, p. 12).
Merilee Grindle has commented that in a development plan
or policy,
there are certain to be interest groups that will have
particular interests in the plan, and their method of
achieving their interests is by making demands on
allocation procedures. Frequently, however, the goals
are in direct conflict with each other and the outcome
of this conflict and consequently who gets what is
determined by the strategies, resources and power
positions of each of the actors involved.
(Grindle, 1976, p. 12)
Anderson, a political economist who did similar analysis
of the Latin American political system came to the following
conclusion:
Programs that are implemented may be the result of a
political caucus of interests and groups competing for
scarce resources, the response of implementing
officials and the actions of political elites, all
interacting within given institutional contexts.
(Anderson, 1972, p. 171)
In view of this conclusion by Anderson, it is probable that
this same conclusion for policy implementation can be applied
to the Kenyan context, for an analysis of the implementation of
specific programs could very well be equivalent to assessing
"power capabilities" of the actors, their interests and the
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strategies for achieving them, as well as the characteristics
of the administration or society in which they interact. This,
in turn, may facilitate assessing the potential for achieving
policy and program goals. To be effective, then, implementors
should be skilled in political strategies and should understand
the "environment" in which they seek to realize public policies
and programs.
C. Resource
Although there are numerous resources for the author's
purposes, land will be the only resource examined. Before
discussing land constraints, let us first describe Kenya's land
policy.
Land in Kenya is held under the tribal and western
concepts of private and state ownership (Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1981, p. 172). These concepts can be classified
into three broad categories of rights or types of title, namely
(1) customary rights, (2) freehold land, and (3) leasehold
land.
The land held under customary rights is enjoyed by the
tribal people. Most of the land is held and shared by
community laws. Most of this land is in rural areas.
Customary rights are allocated to tribal groups in order to
change the traditional tenure patterns of community ownership
into private freehold land. Private freehold land aims to
increase incomes through supporting individual farmers'
production of cash crops. Basically, there are two major
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components in Kenya's rural and urban land policies (Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1981, p. 173). The first is the settlement of
land formerly held by Europeans, while the second is the
granting of titles to individuals and groups for land
previously held under customary tenure.
Freehold land is usually land belonging to an individual.
The individual has the title rights for the land but is still
bound by statutory restrictions on the use of land.
Leasehold land is land held for a fixed term. The term
usually ranges from 50 to 99 years for agricultural land. This
land is leased from the Commissioner of Lands (COL) or from the
local authority.
In 1971, more than two-thirds of Kenya's land was held in
trust (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981, p. 172). Private
freehold land represented only a tiny proportion of all land,
but this included much of the richest farmland and best
developed urban locations. The existence of private freehold
land and its successful development has created problems for
Kenyan authorities because most of the successful development
in Kenya has taken place on private land despite the public
authorities owning most of the urban land. However, public
authorities have the right to acquire private land by eminent
domain if it is in the "public interest" (Hardoy and
Satterthwa.ite, 1981, p. 172). This presents the monopoly of
successful land utilization by the elite.
Control of urban land-use is exercised by the local and
central governments in Kenya by zoning clauses in leases which
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regulate land use, plot size, and types of development.
Building codes are also utilized as a means to exert government
control. Urban development plans designed by the physical
planning department include zoning and estimates of future land
requirements to build public acquisition policy. The
low-income shelter project demonstrates the steps required
(HRDU, 1979, pp. 27-29):
- the assessment of the need for urban shelter and supporting
services;
- the estimation of land requirements;
- the identification of suitable sites, preferably on public
land;
- the assembling of land and, if necessary, the acquisition of
land through eminent domain;
- the preparation of plans and the approval for the services
and for subdivision;
- the installation of services;
- the allocation of plots; and finally,
- the supervision of development of individual plots as
stipulated in letters of lease or offer.
Experience, however, suggests that these steps are rarely
implemented because they are time-consuming.
Land figures prominently as a constraint to policy
implementation in Kenya. Numerous public control methods have
been implemented by the government in an attempt to "correct"
inequalities that exist in land distribution. The issue of
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land is obviously an important factor for successful housing
policy. If the government wanted to build houses for its poor,
especially in urban areas, land becomes the most important
commodity necessary to implement construction plans. In Kenya,
however, the problem is not so much one of inadequate land per
se; it is the problem of delivering the land to target groups
for which the housing is intended to benefit (Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1981, p. 173). The majority of the time, these
target groups are the poor who need this land for use in the
construction of shelter (especially for the "self-help"
approach form of development). The skyrocketing cost of urban
land is an additional factor in the problem of delivering much
needed land to the targeted groups. Although land is usually a
small part of the total cost of shelter, the price of land in
urban areas sometimes rises more rapidly than do incomes (see
Bruch-Biggs, 1979; Frieden, 1975). In addition, other factors
that may influence the value of land, making it unaffordable
for the poor, are (a) inflation, (b) decisions that change land
use, and (c) the demand for preference for single-family
houses.
Given the high cost associated with land, it is not
unusual to find urban land becoming a speculative investment
commodity, virtually risk-free, with a high rate of return.
Furthermore, problems arise when consideration is given to who
generally owns the "decent" land. According to Leys, usually
this is owned by the powerful, rich decision-makers (Leys,
1974, pp. 66-73). Most of the land is used by these people for
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speculative purposes (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981, p. 172);
further contributing to the increase in urban land prices, and
interfering with the economic laws of supply and demand.
Obviously, it would be in the nation's interest to address
these deficiencies and thus to make land policies more
effective.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Review of the Purpose and Objectives
This study has analyzed the BNA in terms of two levels of
action: goal formulation, and policy implementation. With many
factors accounting for the inability of the Kenyan government
to achieve targets in their policies and plans, a question
arose as to whether one factor, more than any other, was
responsible for this inability. This analysis was primarily
concerned with determining how basic needs and objectives have
been formulated in Kenya, and to raise questions about the
consistency between development plans goals on the one hand,
and plan implementation on the other. With these remarks, let
us bring together some conclusions of the findings of this
study.
According to this analysis of the Kenyan housing sector,
the reasons for the unsatisfactory performance of the sector
can be summarized under three headings:
(A) Long delays in the translation of the National Development
Plan into housing policy guidelines and a development
program
(B) The lack of clear objectives for housing projects, and
(C) Problems of land acquisition and allocation.
The translation of development plan policies into programs
in Kenya was perhaps as detrimental to the performance of the
housing sector as any of the previously mentioned factors.
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Because of the structure of the government, there was an
inability (by the central government) to communicate policies
effectively and efficiently to the local authorities. This
resulted in a "constant interplay of short term responses and
adjustments to social and administrative pressures, planning
with arbitrary determined financial constraints, technological
imperatives, and changes in administrative personnel" (Stern,
1978, p. 273). Even those regulatory policies (standards,
building codes, etc.) that were supposed to aid the poor in the
upgrading and development of urban informal areas, for
instance, seemed ineffective and inoperative. In addition, the
lack of technical skills and the interference of politicians in
the planning process were said either to have raised the costs
of materials or to have reduced the accessibility of regulatory
mechanisms to the poor; perhaps contributing to the already
poor performance of the housing sector, and at the same time
creating an almost hopeless situation. In summary,
in a situation of grossly insufficient low-cost
construction, the official policy dilemma is classic:
too much regulation will discourage private building or
lead builders to circumvent the law, but too little
regulation will permit exploitation and threaten
overall planning and public health requirements.
(Stern, 1978, p. 278)
Efforts to implement housing programs furthermore were
hindered by the skyrocketing costs of land (especially close to
urban areas). With urban population growth, the prices of land
in urban areas rose more rapidly than did incomes. In
addition, although the constitution guarantees the protection
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of private property (expressed through the expropriation by
eminent domain of the needed area), action is not normally
taken until after a need or problem has arisen, and not in
anticipation of urban requirements. As such, not only are
compensations likely to be higher-priced, but actions based on
actual and urgent considerations may later turn into obstacles
as far as the implementation of long-term land plans are
concerned. (This does not include the problem of the
unavailability of land for housing construction.) According to
Robert Shaw, "Less than a fifth of the country's land surface
is good arable land. Conversely, half of Kenya is officially
termed "dry bush land" and another fifth is "dwarf-shrub
grassland" which can only sustain nomadic pastoralists. In
1945, there were 4.2 acres of potentially productive land per
person; by the year 2000 the figure will have shrunk to 1.2
acres per person" (Shaw, 1983, p. 23).
Recommendations
Having summarized the findings, the question remains as to
whether anything can be done to rectify Kenya's housing
situation.
The solution to Kenya's housing problems will largely
depend on the motives of the government and its affiliates (in
essence, are government officials really serious about solving
their housing problem?). The objectives or goals of the
housing policy as stipulated in Kenya's Fourth National
Development Plan would probably need to involve the following
processes in order to realize Kenya's housing goals (Kenya,
1979, p. 172):
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1. growth of the public sector to the point of dominating the
private sector;
2. extensive development of infrastructure and public services
to cater to sites and services projects;
3. technical descriptions of how the objectives are to be
achieved; and
4. the consultation and involvement (at the local level) of
people in house construction.
The impression is that for this kind of planning to be
achieved, certain basic political and administrative conditions
must be'met. These conditions can be grouped under three
headings:
1. The political community needs to possess a sense of
solidarity such that trust exists between its various
sections, preventing the inequality impact in development
plans from having the impact of intensifying existing
cleavages.
2. A basic affinity must exist between people and government,
such that the government can ask its citizens to make
sacrifices by engaging in housing construction, and citizens
will do so without excessively reckoning the cost.
3. A country must possess a large skilled and committed public
service that strives to serve the population, and that
possesses a vivid sense of urgency for economic growth.
Given the knowledge about Kenya's governmental structure,
it is doubtful that Kenya fulfills any of the conditions
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described above. For one thing, Kenya really cannot be
considered a "tight-knit" political community (except for the
people in squatter settlements), such that one could expect
"patriotism" from its people to government. Furthermore (as
discussed in the analysis), the government does not possess a
well-equipped administration. As Wolfgang Stolper very wisely
said (in his description of governments in Africa):
[most] Governments must operate under several
limitations. There is first the recalcitrant nature of
the economy. There is secondly the fact that we deal
with plural societies, and thirdly, the lack of
sufficient numbers of well trained people capable of
running things.
(Stolper, 1966, p. 14)
We do not want to give the impression that the Kenyan peoples
do not have a sense of political community. Kenya, after all,
does possess a decent administration when compared to those of
other developing countries. There is no doubt that the people
are willing to be governed. However, it can be argued that
housing policy objectives cannot be carried out unless the
political will is there, and the administration becomes more
effective and efficient. Thus, the government of Kenya and its
planners need to set their goals accordingly, rather than
engaging in grandiose plans that have no means of being
implemented within the required time period.
However, assuming the government was truly committed to
solving Kenya's housing problem, as they have stated, it should
simply be a matter of time for Kenya's housing problem to be
overcome. However, Kenya's Fourth National Development Plan
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has some identifiable implementation problems, one of them
being the lack of clear objectives (in essence, the
formalization or methodology used). There are two reasons why
a more effective housing policy is needed:
1. Once housing policies are incorporated into a national
development plan, they are used in informing interested
parties as to the expected demand and claims public housing
programs will make on the housing agencies, scarce materials
and skilled labor of the construction industry. This
minimizes the risk that unnecessary qeet-necks will develop
(United Nations, 1976, p. 14).
2. A well-defined policy provides guidelines so that some kind
of effective project recognition, preparation, planning,
implementation, and follow-up machinery can be enacted
(Cook and Kuhn, 1982, p. 98). Otherwise, policies become
subjected to reinterpretations by implementers, politicians
and beneficiaries for their own gain.
Utilizing recommendations made by the United Nations
(1976) to developing countries, a national housing policy
should be able to estimate the number, type and standard of
dwellings to be constructed by both the public and the private
sectors respectively. The approximate known time framework in
which projects are to be completed, and the geographical
incidence of these activities need to be known. For public
housing, the role of financial institutions should be
specified, with capital requirements and subsidies identified.
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For the private sector, the type and size of incentives should
also be identified. Income levels and type of families to be
served should be explicit. The amount of land, material,
equipment and labor necessary for attaining these targets
should be calculated, and the manner in which they are made
available should be explained. The ancillary infra-structure,
services, and community facilities required, including their
estimated cost and timing, should be assessed. Finally, the
agencies responsible for executing and/or financing certain
components of the proposed programs should be known.
It was noted earlier that it is important for the Kenyan
government to lower its targets so as to convey a realistic
approach to planning possibilities. Yet it remains imperative
that the government seek the cooperation of the institutions
and firms most active in the housing sector, and if possible,
set up a separate commission that "oversees" the public sector
housing agencies. Grepey (1976) suggests that governments like
that of Kenya need to experiment first with simulation models
as an aid to preparing housing plans in which the expected
growth patterns of cities, migratory movements and other useful
variables are forecasted. "These are helpful for analysing the
consequences of a proposed housing policy versus alternative
policies in terms of the demand and supply characteristics of
building activities and land use patterns" (Grepey, 1976).
It was also pointed out in this analysis that the problem
of centralization was found in the implementation of housing
policies in Kenya. As mentioned earlier, centralization is
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somewhat similar to the constraint of formalization. They both
involve the need for careful policy planning. The primary
difference between centralization and formalization is that the
federal government alone is responsible for stipulating clear
objectives in plans and policies in formalization, whereas any
'external' factor could be responsible for creating
difficulties in communication between the administrative
functions at the national level and those at the regional and
local levels in centralization.
This analysis emphasized the fact that policies are not
always implemented in the manner they were intended. "The
worst problems in housing arise in the Kenyan towns where the
authorities frankly admit their inability to cater to the
provision of houses and services for lower income groups"
(Ghai, 1979, p. 33). There have been long delays in
implementing these policies and some of the blame rests on the
manner the government's policy process is structured. The
obvious solution, therefore, is in finding ways in which the
national housing programs can be better administered at the
national, regional, and local levels. The 're-structuring' in
administration (and consequently the deconcentration of
policies) will relieve key housing officials from repetitious
and detailed tasks related to purely local issues. The speed
and effectiveness in dealing with housing programs will likely
be increased at all levels. As a general rule, however, any
form of decentralization (in essence, functional
responsibilities) need to apply to the lowest "grass roots"
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areas (United Nations, 1976, p. 77). Decentralization thus is
a means and not an end. Premature or excessive
decentralization might be harmful and may lead in some cases to
widespread abuses when inadequate accounting and auditing
control systems exist (United Nations, 1976, p. 77). As a
matter of fact, who or what should be subject to suspicion are
the politicians and others who have vested interests in
housing. For example,
To a large extent, politicians, councellors and senior
government officials often are aware of the low-cost
housing policy, but do not fully support it in its
entirety, especially when there are vested interests.
One point in case, is that housing units built through
public funds and intended for the lower-income groups
have been mis-allocated to the higher-income groups.
the housing policy and the National Housing Corporation
guidelines on site and services programme has clearly
specified that target income groups as those families
within the income range of K.Shs.300/- to K.Shs.l.200/-
per month (KL15 to KL60 p.m.). The HRDU field survey
and discussions with various technical officers have
shown that often political pressures and interferences
in the allocation procedure have resulted in the misuse
of public resources meant to benefit the lower-income
groups.
(HRDU, 1979, p. 24)
Similarly,
The government has over the plan periods injected
sizeable amounts of funds into the housing
sector. . . . it is not very convincing to attribute
the ineffective implementation of the schemes to
widespread inflation and inadequate loan facilities, in
view of the fact that a substantial portion of the
housing revenue has had to be returned to the Treasury
because of inability to utilize the money. In spite of
the biting inflation and general scarcity of funds, it
would appear, housing policies have not been adequately
implemented largely because of organizational
inefficiency which seems to characterize the National
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Housing Corporation and the local authorities, and also
due to political manoeuvres.
(HRDU, 1979, p. 27)
Thus to be successful with a 'decentralization' proposal, the
government needs to devise a system that specifies the nature,
extent, and limits of delegated responsibility and
accountability, regarding all programs, administration, and
financial matters. "Essential to the success of
decentralization is the drawing of lines of demarcation between
larger policy issues and day-to-day administrative tasks, the
former being referred to headquarters for decision" (United
Nations, 1979, p. 78).
In conclusion, it is also the belief of the author that no
policy (no matter how well documented) can be acceptable so
long as there are political interferences and pressures in the
implementation of the policy and programs.
Furthermore, public authorities should be given
pre-emption rights to acquire land in special development zones
as a resolution to the problems of land acquisition and
housing. 'Preemption' is the right given to government
institutions enabling them to have first priority in buying
land. In the case where a landowner is interested in selling
his land, the government needs to have the right to purchase
the land at defined prices existing before the zone is declared
a planned area. Such a policy would resolve the current
problem of higher prices being paid by the government for
compensation.
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Compensation payments, therefore, would be based on
that estimated value adjusted to take into account
subsequent capital improvements on the land and
monetary corrections based on a cost-of-living factor
index or some similar national indicator of growth and
inflationary pressures.
(United Nations, 1976, p. 41)
If used properly, a land policy that combines the rights
of pre-emption and the freezing of land values, is an
"effective way of removing speculation for the land market and
maintaining pre-development land price levels in areas for sale
contiguous to publicly purchased land (United Nations, 1976, p.
41). However, according to the United Nations (1976) report
(which initially promoted this idea),
The rights of pre-emption, however, should not be
relied on exclusively for land acquisition, since an
acquisition policy cannot be based solely on acquiring
land that is for sale. It must be combined with
policies for expropriating land, where necessary, and
for creating land "banks" or reserves for future needs.
(United Nations, 1976, p. 41)
In terms of the implementation of land policies for land
allocation, the role of the national government "should be that
of fashioning land policies and, through a national land-use
authority working in concert with local governments, ensuring
their implementation (United Nations, 1976, p. 48). (Details
for this proposal can be found in the United Nations report
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(1976) and the HRDU report on the evaluation of Site and
Service housing schemes (1979, pp. 3-10).)
Some final Observations are that there is a need for a
distinction between program and policy and a need for an
effective plan to deal with uncertainty in policy
implementation. As noted in the analysis of Kenya's housing
policy, it is important to understand the difference between
housing development program and actual implementation of
policy. This is often difficult to accomplish, because in a
policy, there are a variety of programs that are developed in
response to policy goals. Programs, on the other hand, cause
change in the policy environment. This distinction between
policy and program would also imply that policy implementation
is a function of program implementation and therefore is
dependent on its outcome. Consequently, the research or study
of the process of implementation almost automatically involves
an investigation and an analysis of programs that are designed
as a means of achieving broader policy goals. As previously
stated, it is doubtful if such clear distinctions between
policy and programs are ever maintained in reality. Our task
was greatly impeded by the need to take into account the
variety of levels at which the term "policy" was often used in
development plans. In the area of housing for example, some
policies are regulatory (in essence, they attempt to control
individual action in the private sector) while other policies
are developmental (in essence, they attempt to create new
housing using public resources (Stern, 1978, p. 5). It was
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also necessary to know at what point, for instance, did the
program's failure (in essence, Urban Informal housing
development), signal the overall failure of the general policy.
The program's success does necessarily mean that because the
aims of the program are in accordance with the aims of the
policy that the policy goals will be achieved. Not
surprisingly, this is an assumption that has typically worked
in practice in developing countries. (See G. Benveniste,
1970,E. Lozano, 1975). Economists such as Merilee Grindle have
even tried to resolve the problem of assessing the failure of a
policy versus the failure of a program by viewing
implementation as a general administrative process that can be
analyzed at a specific problem level. Success of a program,
she states, would be evaluated by asking the question, "Did the
program actually do what it set out to do?" Consequently,
program evaluation would be based on a measurement of program
outcomes versus policy goals (Grindle, 1976). The process of
policy implementation would therefore involve three things: (1)
specifying general goals and objectives, (2) designing
programs, and (3) allocating funds for the pursuit of goals.
Grindle was able to differentiate policy failure from program
failure in her discussion of implementation as a political and
administrative process (Grindle, 1976).
Any discussion of policy implementation is considered
important because the expected feedback from procedures of
implementation could lead to modifications in policy goals and
directions. In essence, the rules and guidelines interpreted
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or re-interpreted could lead to a considerable number of new
policies being made at sites of execution. More importantly,
these revisions in the process of implementation might mean
that final decisions devised at the design or formulation stage
might have an impact on how the implementation process
proceeds. For example, a decision by the government to
allocate five million dollars rather than five hundred million
to the development of Urban Informal housing areas will have
considerable impact on the subsequent implementation plans.
It follows that the initial assumption made about a
perfectly programmed development strategy or policy is that
they might at least achieve a rare degree of certainty about
the outcome or at least create a situation in which the
probability of a successful outcome can be fairly accurately
made. This would mean that a development plans policy or
strategy (such as the "self-help" approach adopted by Kenya)
needs to identify the exact causal relationship between the
policy and the consequences of its implementation. From this,
maybe the appropriate operational activities can be deduced.
In addition, the development strategy or policy might take into
consideration, or attempt to hold constant, the behavior of
exogenous variables. The argument is that "if conditions are
otherwise, then the operating agency will be compelled to adapt
to unpredictable environmental change by deviating from
programmed procedures or even by goal alteration" (Chege, 1972,
p. 3). In Kenya, many development projects have been
implemented with many uncertainties surrounding their outcome,
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and as reported earlier, the failure of many programs and
policies to succeed are attributed to these "uncertainties" or
to the intervening of environmental variables (Kenya, 1979).
Uncertainties surrounding the probabilities of
developmental policy outcomes are seldom analyzed, and as a
result, governments can often use uncertainties as an excuse
for not performing well.
It will be interesting to see how the government of Kenya
will perform in the years to come. Maybe the failures of
policies will continue to be blamed on these "uncertainties"
surrounding outcome, maybe not. One thing that is certain,
however, is that improvements in the housing sector will have
to be made.
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APPENDIX
Currency Equivalents
Currency Units
KSh 1.00
US$ 1.00
Kenya Shillings (KSh)
US$ 0.0095*
KSh 10.5
*The dollar-shilling conversion factor given here is based on the
approximate exchange rate in effect in mid-1982.
